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Abstract
This dissertation examines the circumstances
surrounding and the rhetoric involved in the cold fusion
controversy begun on

March 23, 1989, when two University

of Utah electrochemists, Martin Fleischmann and Stanley
Pons, announced by press conference the discovery of room—
temperature nuclear fusion.

The dissertation seeks to

determine to what extent a rhetorical analysis of cold
fusion discourse may increase understanding of the
controversy; the success of Fleischmann and Pons as
scientific rhetors;

the ways in which scientists'

attitudes, values, and assumptions manifest themselves in
the discourse; and finally, what may be learned about
scientific discourse in general by examining the cold
fusion controversy in particular. The dissertation employs
a method of analysis which combines Lawrence J. Prelli's
special theory of scientific rhetoric that identifies
relevant issues and lines of argument in scientific
discourse, and S. Michael Halloran's method of close
textual reading suggested in his study of DNA discourse.
Examined were Fleischmann and Pons's initial publication
announcing the cold fusion discovery in the Journal of
Electroanalvtical Chemistry; Steven E. Jones's initial
publication of his cold fusion discovery and several
representative discourse samples from the journal Nature;
and Fleischmann and Pons's latest article in the Journal of
v

Fusion Technology.
were identified.

Several issues and lines of argument

For the most part, cold fusion discourse

addressed evidential issues, questioning the existence of
the cold fusion phenomenon.

Several lines of argument were

evoked to address this issue, including experimental
competence, experimental replication, external consistency,
communality, and disinterestedness.

Also discovered is

division between electrochemists and physicists over what
constitutes valid evidence:

electrochemists looked to

excess heat production as proof of fusion;
looked to neutron production.

physicists

The study concludes that

Fleischmann and Pons followed an unsuccessful rhetorical
strategy in their initial published paper, one that
addresses of issue of existence, but their evidence was
insufficient to convince as to the scientific
reasonableness of the cold fusion claim.

An alternative

rhetorical strategy was available to Fleischmann and Pons,
one in which they could have interpreted, rather than
asserted, their evidence, thereby evoking a less
confrontational response from the scientific community.

Chapter O n e :

Introduction

Historians, philosophers, and sociologists have,
within the last thirty years, begun to renew their
attention to and reevaluate the way in which science
operates.

A prominent reason for this vigorous interest in

science seems clear:

more and more, science is becoming a

fundamental part of everyday life, typically as expanding
technology.

As S. Michael Halloran observes, scientific

matters are increasingly debated in the public arena (once,
interestingly, the province of rhetoric):
Science is itself an increasingly public
enterprise, both in the sense that the public
supports it financially and in the sense that it
offers monumental threats and promises to our
well-being.
Science also serves as warrant for
many arguments about traditionally non
specialized, civic questions — war and peace,
ways and means for promoting the public welfare.
To understand public discourse in the closing
decades of this century, we must have some
understanding of scientific discourse.
(81)
For similar reasons, Michael S. Overington argues, "it is
time that students of rhetoric bend their skills to an
analysis of scientific discourse and the creation of
scientific knowledge"

(143).

In this study I shall answer

Overington's call to students of rhetoric and attempt to
contribute to what Halloran called a need for "a body of
critical literature on particular cases of scientific
discourse"

(81)

by applying a working method of rhetorical

analysis to a modern scientific controversy.
1

The particular case I have selected for study came to
the public's attention on March 23, 1989.

On that day,

University of Utah officials held a press conference to
announce that two of their researchers, Martin Fleischmann
and Stanley Pons, had made a break-through discovery that
promised to change the face of the world:
nuclear fusion.

sustained cold

Using simple apparatus, the two chemists

had harnessed the power of the sun under room temperature
using a fuel source literally as abundant as seawater.
implications of such a discovery were staggering:

The

a cheap,

limitless source of energy.
Soon, however, the bright promise of the break-through
discovery was dimmed by controversy and questions:

Had

Fleischmann and Pons acted as responsible scientists?

Was

what they observed in the lab actually cold nuclear fusion?
Why could some scientists report replication while others
reported finding nothing at all?

What was the relationship

between the scientists of the University of Utah and those
of rival Brigham Young, who reported a similar discovery?
And so on.
To establish an understanding of the cold fusion
process and an appreciation for the implications of the
Fleischmann/Pons claim, I will first present, in this
chapter, a brief discussion of the basic mechanics of
nuclear energy, concluding with an explanation of the type
of cold fusion that Fleischmann and Pons believe they
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created.

Also, I will review the circumstances surrounding

the Fleischmann/Pons announcement and the events that
followed in order to establish a context for the resulting
discourse in the cold fusion controversy.

Chapter two

reviews literature relevant to the rhetorical nature of
science.

Chapter three presents methodology for the

rhetorical analysis of scientific discourse.

Chapter four

contains the rhetorical analysis of the discourse found in
the cold fusion controversy, and chapter five discusses the
implications and conclusions of this study.

The Four Types of Nuclear Energy
The discussion that follows is based on my
understanding of the nuclear processes after reading
various sources, including F. David Peat's eloquent and
accessible explanation of cold fusion, and David H.
Freedman's article on "hot" fusion.
Nuclear Fission
The form of nuclear energy most of us are already
familiar with is nuclear fission.

This type of nuclear

energy powers electric generating stations and is the type
of energy used in the first atom bomb.

In the electric

generating station, the nuclear reaction both is controlled
and sustained.

In the atom bomb, uranium atoms are

sundered by a brief explosion that results in an immediate
release of energy.

4

In nuclear fission, the nuclei, or centers, of uranium
atoms are encouraged to split.

In this process, a part of

the mass of the nucleus of the atom is converted into a
tremendous amount of energy.
Aside from the source of the energy, a nuclear power
plant operates much like one fueled by coal or oil.

The

heat, in this case generated by splitting uranium nuclei,
converts water into steam, which in turn propels turbines,
which in turn generate electricity.

Generating electricity

by using nuclear fission is a cleaner process than burning
fossil fuels, is not limited by scarcity as are fossil
fuels, and is commercially viable.

A real concern,

however, is what to do with the highly radioactive waste,
an unavoidable by-product of nuclear fission.

Nuclear Fusion
Somewhat surprisingly, this type of nuclear energy is
less familiar but is not an uncommon occurrence.

In fact,

right now more nuclear fusion is taking place than nuclear
fission.

However, the conditions under which nuclear

fusion occurs takes it out of the realm of everyday
experience;

nuclear fusion powers our sun, as well as

every other star.
Unlike nuclear fission, in which atomic nuclei are
split, nuclear fusion is the process wherein two atomic
nuclei— specifically, two hydrogen nuclei— actually fuse,
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or come together.

This fusion, or melding, results in a

form of helium and a free neutron.

These two products of

nuclear fusion weigh much less than the nuclei which
combined, and the loss in mass is released as energy, as
described by Einstein's famous formula,

E = me2.

Simply

put, the energy released is equal to the loss in mass,
multiplied by the square of the speed of light.

Since the

speed of light is 186,000 miles per second, before
squaring, obviously much energy is released from even the
smallest incidence of fusion and is far greater than that
produced by nuclear fission (Freedman).
Encouraging hydrogen nuclei to fuse is difficult.

At

the core of a star, the combination of crushing gravity and
incredible temperatures cause hydrogen nuclei to overcome
atomic forces, which normally cause them to repel one
another due to their like positive charges, and fuse.
Efforts are underway, however, to duplicate and
harness the conditions and reactions that power the sun.
Obviously, the engineering and theoretical obstacles are
many.

The basic challenges are heating the hydrogen atoms

to millions of degrees and then holding them closely enough
together for a long enough time to increase the probability
that the atoms will collide and fuse.
Attempts at creating "hot" nuclear fusion have
resulted in the construction of the tokamak, a room—sized,
stainless-steel, donut—shaped chamber, into which is pumped
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plasma—

hydrogen gas so hot that the electrons are

stripped free from their atoms, resulting in a hot soup of
swirling, colliding nuclei and electrons.

Of course, the

walls of the tokamak would melt if they came into contact
with the plasma cloud— which has been heated to a record
670 million degrees at the Princeton tokamak (Freedman
32)— so powerful electric fields inside the tokamak act as
a sort of "magnetic bottle"

(Peat 32) to suspend the plasma

within while it is heated even further.
To facilitate fusion, an isotopic form of hydrogen is
used, deuterium.

Deuterium is actually a naturally

occurring element, relatively abundant in sea and drinking
water:

about 1 in every 6,700 hydrogen atoms exist as

deuterium (Peat 25).

Whereas a hydrogen molecule consists

of one proton in the nucleus orbited by one electron (the
simplest elemental configuration), deuterium consists of a
nucleus of one proton and one neutron orbited by a single
electron.

Chemically, deuterium is identical to hydrogen

in the way it behaves and interacts with other elements.
However, the extra neutron plays an important role in
forming the by-products of fusion, helium and the free
neutron, which weigh less than the two deuterium atoms.
This "lost" mass is converted into energy as described
above.

Deuterium figures prominently in the following

discussions of "cold" nuclear fusion.

7

Muon Catalyzed Cold Nuclear Fusion
In July, 1987, Johann Rafelski and Steven E. Jones
(the same Steven Jones who figures in the cold fusion
controversy) published an article in Scientific American
entitled "Cold Nuclear Fusion.”

They described a process

known as "muon catalyzed fusion,"
fusion."

also termed "cold

Actually, the fusion process is "cold" only when

compared to the above described process that requires a
plasma of millions of degrees.

The fusion process

described by Rafelski and Jones actually works best at
around 900 degrees Celsius.
A muon is a short-lived, electron— like particle that
behaves very much like an electron. In muon catalyzed cold
fusion, muons are fired into a gas of deuterium and
tritium, which is also an isotopic form of hydrogen with
two protons and one neutron in the nucleus orbited by a
single electron.
however,
quickly.

Tritium, unlike hydrogen and deuterium,

is highly radioactive and decays relatively
As the muon travels through the deuterium/tritium

gas, it collides with orbiting electrons and will
eventually displace an orbiting electron, knocking it
aside, much like the collision between billiard balls.
However,

instead of careening off, the muon is captured by

the nucleus and replaces the electron, taking up an orbit
around the nucleus.
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One of the important properties of the muon, however,
is that although it is electron—like, its mass is around
200 times greater than that of the displaced electron.
Therefore, it orbits the nucleus around 200 times more
closely than did the original electron.

As a result, the

nuclei of the deuterium or tritium molecule are brought
about 200 times closer than normal.
As it turns out in the weird realm described by
quantum mechanics, there is another way to fuse nuclei.
One way, described above, is to accelerate through super
heating the nuclei while they are in close proximity, as in
the plasma.

The fast-moving nuclei collide and thus fuse.

Another, less violent method involves holding nuclei very
close for an extended time.

During this time, there is a

probability that a phenomenon known as "quantum tunneling"
will take place.
Due to quantum uncertainty, and as described by Werner
Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle,

"there is an intrinsic

ambiguity in pinning down the specifications of a nucleus"
(Peat 46).

Normally, nuclei find themselves on opposite

sides of a barrier that works to keep them apart.

However,

because of this "intrinsic ambiguity" concerning the
location of a nucleus, there exists a small probability
that a nucleus held in close proximity to another for an
extended time may actually find itself on the other side of
the repulsion barrier.

Thus, through quantum tunneling, a
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nucleus may pass through the barrier of repulsion, at which
point the atomic force that binds and holds together nuclei
takes over, causing the nuclei to fuse.
Though muon catalyzed cold fusion holds promise to one
day provide a viable commercial energy source, several
problems must be overcome.

One problem lies in the short

life span of the muon, which lasts only for about two
millionths of a second.

Another lies in the fact that

creating the muons requires more energy than is produced
thus far in the reaction chamber.

Still another problem

lies in the number of fusions that a single (short-lived)
muon can catalyze.

Rafelski and Jones observe that

"pioneering research in physics tends to precede
applications beneficial to society by one or two
generations"

(89).

Even though a promise, then, muon

catalyzed fusion remains a distant one.
Given the theoretical, technological, and practical
problems associated with both nuclear fission and nuclear
fusion, it is little wonder that Fleischmann and Pons's
announcement of successfully generating and maintaining
fusion reactions in a laboratory test tube at room
temperatures caused such a stir among the scientific and
lay community.

Following is a description of another

method, the Fleischmann and Pons method, of cold nuclear
fusion.
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Electrochemicallv Induced Cold Nuclear Fusion
This method is deceptively modest.

Its basis is the

same process used in many high school chemistry labs for
producing hydrogen g as : simple electrolysis.
In the high school lab, two electrodes are submersed
in water a small distance apart.

When a current is run

through the electrodes, the water is reduced to its basic
constituents, hydrogen and oxygen.

The oxygen moves to one

electrode while the hydrogen moves to the other, both to
bubble off.

In the high school lab, the hydrogen is

collected (and then ignited to demonstrate the
combustibility of the gas).

This process is exactly that

used by Fleischmann and Pons, but with different apparatus.
The electrodes in this case consist of platinum and
palladium.

Palladium is important to the process because

of its atomic structure and its affinity for absorbing
hydrogen before it can bubble away.

These electrodes are

submersed into deuterized water, D20; that is, water
composed mostly of deuterium molecules instead of normal
hydrogen molecules,

H20.

The oxygen travels to the

platinum electrode while the deuterium travels to and is
absorbed into the open lattice work structure of the
palladium electrode.

Simply put, the electrolysis

continues, packing more and more deuterium into the atomic
structure of the palladium.

Soon, the deuterium nuclei are

packed so tightly by the galvanic pressure for an extended

11

time that quantum tunneling takes place, resulting in cold
fusion of the deuterium nuclei.

As in other fusion

processes, the products of this cold fusion are light
helium and a free neutron, along with a tremendous amount
of heat energy, all of which become important in
discussions about whether Fleischmann and Pons had actually
achieved what they claimed.
Following is a timeline of events surrounding
Fleischmann and Pons's announcement of cold nuclear fusion,
adapted, updated, and expanded from a timeline developed by
Peat

(180-182).

Many of the events described here are

referred to in chapter four as they relate to the rhetoric
surrounding the scientific discourse concerning cold
fusion.

The articles for the rhetorical analysis in

chapter four are identified in the timeline by bold-faced
type and full bibliographic information.

Cold Fusion Timeline
August 192 6

• Paneth and Peters, two German researchers,
cause a stir among physicists by publishing
a paper reporting the creation of helium
from hydrogen using a palladium catalyst
(recall that helium is a by-product of
fusion).

Though nuclear fusion was an

unknown process at the time, the conversion
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of hydrogen into helium would have proved a
valuable discovery.
April 1927

• Paneth et al. retract the claim, having
underrated two sources of error involving
helium contamination: glass heated in a
hydrogen atmosphere yields up absorbed
helium, and palladium heated in the presence
of hydrogen, but not oxygen, readily
releases helium.

March 24, 1951 • Argentine dictator Juan Peron, along with
physicist Ronald Richter,

calls a press

conference, announcing to the world that
Argentina had succeeded in controlling
nuclear fusion.

Eighteen months later,

Peron realized he had been hoaxed; Richter
was reportedly arrested after having spent
$70 million (Waters).
1972

• Three University of Utah scientists make
headlines when they report the creation of
an X —ray laser, a project that had baffled
many researchers for y e ar s .

No known

physical process existed to explain the
phenomenon,

and the laser effect worked only

about one time out of ten:

some scientists

reported confirmation while others observed
nothing.

The evidence was greeted with
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skepticism.

Later, researchers discovered

the evidence was created by an altogether
unrelated effect.

Physicists laughingly

have termed such situations the "Utah
Effect"
July 1987

{Pool 420) .

• Steven Jones of Brigham Young University
co-authors a paper,

"Cold Nuclear Fusion,"

published in Scientific American.

Jones

describes a process of muon catalyzed cold
fusion and situates himself in cold fusion
research.
Fall 1988

• Martin Fleischmann and Stanley Pons apply
for a Department of Energy grant for funds
to continue their cold fusion research
(their process is described above), having
already invested $100,000 of their own money
into the research (Dagani).

December 1988

• Steven Jones acts as one of the reviewers
for the Fleischmann and Pons grant.

He

approaches Fleischmann and Pons through the
Department of Energy about collaboration
because his own work overlaps significantly
with theirs.

Jones's approach was to

duplicate the conditions of the earth's
interior instead of the sun's.
Concentrations of naturally occurring He3 (a

14

by-product of nuclear fusion) around
volcanoes and oceanic fissures suggested to
Jones that the heat of the earth's core was
the result of nuclear fusion.

Jones and

coworkers' experiments dealt with "lowvoltage electrolytic infusion of deuterons
into metallic titanium or palladium
electrodes"

(Jones et al, "Observation" 737)

that are emersed in a soup of eight metallic
salts, such as those found in the earth's
interior.
Additionally, Jones offers Fleischmann
and Pons the use of a highly sensitive
neutron detection device (recall that
neutron release is also a fusion by
product) .

The device, of his own design, is

the only one of its kind.

No agreement

concerning collaboration is reached.

1989
February

• Jones decides he is ready to publish his
results.

March 6

• Fleischmann and Pons, along with the
president of the University of Utah, meet
with Jones and the president of BYU.
Fleischmann and Pons would like another
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eighteen months to work on their project,
but both parties agree to publish their work
by submitting papers simultaneously to
Nature on March 24.
March 10

• Pons speaks with the U.S. editor of the
Journal of Electroanalytical Chemistry about
a manuscript of the cold fusion paper.

March 11

• Pons mails the manuscript.

March 17

• University of Utah p r es s 'officials
interview Fleischmann and Pons about their
cold fusion experiments.

March 22

• University of Utah officials announce a
major press conference for the next day.

March 23

• Fleischmann and Pons announce their
discovery of cold fusion at a press
conference in Salt Lake City.
• After hearing at the press conference that
Fleischmann and Pons had prepared a
manuscript, Jones and his team of BYU
researchers submit their manuscript to
Nature.

March 24

• Fleischmann and Pons submit their own
paper to Nature and express irritation with
Jones for breaking their agreement.
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• A Brigham Young University press release
announces the independent discovery of cold
fusion by Jones.
March 31

• Fleischmann meets with a group of
physicists at the European Center for
Nuclear Research (CERN) near Geneva,
Switzerland, to explain cold fusion.

He is

well received.
April

• In the following weeks, a flurry of press
releases, faxed reports, e-mail messages,
and rumors from labs all over the world,
including Stanford and Texas A & M, appear
to

confirm cold fusion.

But soon research

groups report negative results in which they
claim to have seen nothing.
April 7

• The Utah State Legislature,

in a special

session, passes the Fusion/Energy Technology
Act.

Governor Norm Bangerter requests the

state to release $5 million in research
funds.
April 10

•

The Journal of Electroanalvtical

Chemistry publishes a "Preliminary note, 11
the Fleischmann and Pons article about their
cold fusion experiments
and Stanley P o n s .

(Fleischmann, Martin

"Electrochemically

Induced Nuclear Fusion of Deuterium."

17

Journal of Electroanalvtical Chemistry 261
(1989): 301—308).

Though the article is

brief and contains little information about
apparatus and none about control
experiments,

journal editor W. Ronald

Fawcett says that the article is "a very
important piece of science... definitely
worth publishing as a preliminary
communication"
April 12

(Dagani 14).

• Pons delivers a lecture,

"Nuclear Fusion

in a Test Tube?" to around 7,000 chemists at
an American Chemical Society national
meeting in Dallas.

Clayton Callis, ACS

president, remarks that physicists' attempts
at hot fusion were "too expensive and too
ambitious....Now it appears that chemists
have come to the rescue"

("Scientific" 605).

Pons is mobbed by reporters and has to
change motels.
April 17

• Pons announces a fusion reaction sustained
for 800 hours in one of his cells.

April 18

• Italian researchers from Frascati announce
cold fusion of a different kind, in which
deuterium gas is pumped into titanium metal
under high pressure.•
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April 20

• Nature explains that Jones' paper,
received March 23, would be published the
next week but that Fleischmann and Pons's,
received March 27, would not.

The

Fleischmann and Pons article received by
Nature is a brief version of that which
earlier appeared in the Journal of
Electroanalvtical Chemistry.

Asked to amend

their text in response to reviewer's
questions, Fleischmann and Pons decline in
order to "satisfy more urgent work."

Nature

states that "the non- appearance of the
article must not be taken to imply that the
experiments...by Fleischmann and Pons are
inherently less believable than those of
Jones et al"
April 26

("Cold Fusion in Print" 604).

• Fleischmann, Pons, and Jones appear before
the House Science, Space, and Technology
Committee.

University of Utah President

Chase N. Peterson encourages the
organization of a national cold fusion
center with an initial investment of $100
million.

He also requests from the federal

government $25 million in seed money.
April 27

• Jones and coworkers' cold fusion paper
appears in Nature (Jones, S. E., at al.
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"Observation of Cold Nuclear Fusion in
Condensed Matter."

Nature 338 (1989): 737 —

740). In that same issue, Nature editor John
Maddox lashes out at Fleischmann and Pons,
saying their claim "is literally unsupported
by the evidence"

(Maddox, John.

say about cold fusion."

Nature

"What to
338

(1989):

701) .
May 1—2

• The American Physical Society holds
special late-night sessions at the spring
meeting in Baltimore.

Physicist Steven

Koonin is applauded after he remarks that
the excess heat observed by Fleischmann and
Pons is more an indication of "incompetence,
perhaps delusion" than cold fusion
4).

(Lindley

Vocal critic Nathan Lewis, of the

California Institute of Technology,

and W.

Meyerhof, of Stanford, attack Fleischmann
and Pons on the grounds of poor calorimetry
and data interpretation.

The poor

calorimetry results from Fleischmann and
Pons's failure to stir the liquid in their
fusion cells during temperature sampling.
Jones' claims, however, are well received,
due in part to his more modest claims of
neutron output and his ability to gather

sensitive neutron flux measurements with the
detector that he designed.
Pons do not attend.

Fleischmann and

The "physicists

attending were left with the comfortable
feeling that fusion was dead, except for the
small effects of the sort claimed by the
Brigham Young group"
•

(Lindley 4).

The American Electrochemical Society

warmly receives the news of cold fusion at
its meeting in San Diego.
•

A damaging criticism of the gamma— ray

spectra collected by Fleischmann and Pons
appears in the "Scientific Correspondence"
section of Nature (Petrasso, R.D., et al.
"Problems with the y-ray spectrum in the
Fleischmann et a l . experiments."

Nature

339 (1989) 183-185).
• A cold fusion workshop organized by the
Department of Energy and held at Los Alamos
National Laboratory is attended by
scientists from all over the world and is
carried by satellite across North America.
Fleischmann and Pons are absent.

Both

negative and positive results are presented,
and the scientists fail to reach a definite
conclusion about cold fusion.

June 15

• Scientists announce at a press conference
in Harwell, UK that, following extensive
experimentation, they failed to establish
evidence of cold fusion.

They are

abandoning their experimentations.
July 12

• An interim report from the Department of
Energy states, "The experiments reported to
date do not present convincing evidence that
useful sources of energy will result from
the phenomena attributed to cold fusion."

June 29

Fleischmann and Pons respond in the
"Scientific Correspondence" section of
Nature to the criticisms of their gamma—ray
spectra by Petrasso, et a l . that appeared in
the May 18th issue of Nature (Fleischmann,
Martin and Stanley Pons.
rays from cold fusion."
667).

"Measurement of y—
Nature 339 (1989)

In this same section, Petrasso et a l .

reply to the Fleischmann and Pons letter
(Petrasso, et al. "Petrasso et al. reply."
Nature 339 (1989) 667-669).
August

• The state of Utah disburses $5 million to
establish a National Cold Fusion Institute
there.

October 16-18

• A workshop entitled "Anomalous Effects in
Deuterized Materials," sponsored by the
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National Science Foundation and the Electric
Power Research Institute, results in a
relatively positive report concerning cold
fusion and recommends that fxirther study is
justified.
November 12

• The Department of Energy issues a final,
skeptical report on cold fusion: "The panel
concludes that the present evidence for the
discovery of a new nuclear process termed
cold fusion is not persuasive."

The word

"persuasive" was chosen deliberately,
remarked co-chair Norman F. Ramsey.
not to say it's untrue"
December

"That's

(Goodwin 45).

• Both the Bhabha Atomic Research Center in
India and scientists in Japan report
positive cold fusion results.

1990
January 1

• Pons begins extensive new experimentation
involving sixty—four cold fusion cells.

February 1

• Fritz G. Will is named head of the
National Cold Fusion Institute.

March 28—31

• The first annual Cold Fusion Conference is
conducted in Salt Lake City.

March 29

• A paper in Nature reports that independent
measurements taken on Pons's cells produced
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no confirmation of a nuclear reaction.

In

that same issue appears an editorial,
"Farewell

(not fond) to cold fusion,"

comparing the search for cold fusion to that
for the Philosopher's Stone.
July

• Fleischmann and Pons's article,
"Calorimetric Measurements of the Palladium/
Deuterium System:

Fact and Fiction,"

appears in the Journal of Fusion Technology
(Pons, Stanley and Martin Fleischmann.
"Calorimetric Measurements of the
Palladium/Deuterium System:

Fact and

Fiction." Journal of Fusion Technology 17
(1990): 669-679.)

In this article, Pons and

Fleischmann answer many specific criticisms.

Statement of Purpose
The cold fusion controversy promises a unique
opportunity for a case study of scientific discourse and
the way in which scientists rely on rhetoric in the "doing
of science."

This study of the cold fusion controversy

argues against Herbert W. Simon's statement that scientific
discourse is rhetorical only in the "softer" sciences such
as social psychology.

No "evidence of a pattern of

sophistic practices within the better established sciences
such as physics or chemistry" has been offered, he says
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(126).

However, the process of cold fusion uniquely

bridges the "hard" disciplines of particle, atomic, and
nuclear physics and electrochemistry.
Additionally, the cold fusion controversy presents an
excellent opportunity to examine the extent to which an
understanding of the context surrounding scientific
discourse may enrich a study of scientific rhetoric.
I will attempt to answer the following questions by
analyzing the discourse surrounding the cold fusion
controversy:

To what extent might a rhetorical analysis of

the cold fusion discourse increase our understanding of the
controversy?

How successful as rhetors were Fleischmann

and Pons in convincing their audience of the scientific
reasonableness of their claims of cold fusion?

To what

extent and in what ways do scientists' attitudes, values,
and assumptions manifest themselves in the discourse of the
controversy?

And finally, what may be learned about

scientific discourse in general by examining the cold
fusion controversy in particular?

Chapter T w o :

Review of the Literature

Traditionally, scientific discourse has not been
considered a text for rhetorical evaluation.

The classical

tradition maintains a strict dichotomy between science and
rhetoric.

Aristotle argued that science dealt with

demonstrably true certainties, whereas rhetoric dealt with
matters of opinion, or the uncertain.

James Kelso suggests

that rhetoricians have disregarded a rhetorical aspect of
scientific discourse based on conclusions drawn from
Aristotle: science is not open to deliberation, and the
certainties of the natural world are distinct from the
contingencies of human convention.

Kelso maintains that

rhetoricians have traditionally failed to realize that
scientific theories may be considered symbolic
representations of reality

(28).

In the following sections, I will review
representative scholarship from the philosophy, rhetoric,
and sociology of science, and examine an emerging
discipline known as the rhetoric of inquiry.

The

discussion of these disciplines will demonstrate how the
rhetoric of science is bound to and draws upon each:
their communicative practices,

in

scientists draw on knowledge

of how science operates, how scientists interact, and how
scientists conduct inquiry.
epistemological implications

Finally, I briefly address the
of a rhetoric of science.
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In
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each, of these sections,. I show that persuasive discourse is
an integral component of scientific practice.

The Philosophy of Science
The past thirty years have seen an active exchange of
views

among the modern philosophers of science, ranging

from the highly rational, empirically based views of
science of Sir Karl Popper to what has been called the
irrational,
Thomas Kuhn.

"mob rule" view of

scientific activity held by

Despite much debate

among the philosophers

of science, there is no consensus concerning which
theoretical approach in the philosophy of

science is the

best to pursue to accomplish two goals: to provide a
framework for the further development of effective
scientific theories and to provide a model that scientists
may follow to ensure that their theoretical pursuits will
result in the best contribution to scientific knowledge.
While the views of the major philosophers of science differ
greatly, all the views may be reconciled with the notion
that scientific communication is rhetorical.

The

philosophies I review here include those of Sir Karl Popper
and his theory of falsificationism, Imre Lakatos and his
method of the scientific research program, and Thomas Kuhn
and his theory involving paradigms, normal science, and
revolution in the development of scientific theories.
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Sir Karl Popper is a most influential philosopher of
science, and perhaps the champion of the rational approach.
Conjectures and Refutations, originally published in 1962,
gives the foundation for his method of falsification, and
Objective Knowledge, revised in 1979, presents his
epistemic theories concerning scientific practice.
Rejecting from the beginning the notion of theory
verification, Popper asserts that the falsification of
theories is the only rational procedure for developing
scientific theory.

Popper agrees with philosopher David

Hume, who casts much doubt on induction,

asserting that no

argument may establish
'that those instances, of which we have had no
experience, resemble those, of which we have had
experience.'
Consequently, 'even after the
observation of the frequent or constant
conjunction of objects, we have no reason to draw
any inference concerning any object beyond those
of which we have had experience...why from this
experience we form any conclusion beyond those
past instances, of which we have had experience.'
(Conjectures 42)
Therefore, verifying a theory is impossible because one
cannot logically conclude that because past tests have
confirmed a theory, future tests will do so likewise.
At this point, both Hume and Popper are left with an
important problem:
we

if induction is illogical, how then do

account for our amassing knowledge?

knowledge

obtained?

How is our

Popper suggests that we actively try

to impose regularities upon the world.

We try to discover

similarities in it and to interpret it in terms of laws
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invented by us.
conclusions.

Without waiting for premises, we jump to

These may have to be discarded later, should

observation show that they are wrong.
This was a theory of trial and error— of
conjectures and refutations....conjectures boldly
put forward for trial, to be eliminated if they
clashed with observations;
with observations
which were rarely accidental but as a rule
undertaken with the definite intention of testing
a theory by obtaining, if possible, a decisive
refutation. (Conjectures 4 6)
The scientist, then, should proceed as follows:
theory

state a

that may be tested through observation and name

before any

testing the conditions or outcomes by which the

theory may be

considered as falsified, or refuted.

Naming

the conditions beforehand that will falsify the theory
demarcates,

for Popper, the scientific theory from the

pseudo—scientific (some theories, such as some astrological
theories, can never really be said to be true or false, for
it is difficult to name precise conditions under which such
theories may be said to be wrong or false) and establishes
a rational means of scientific progress based on integrity
and disallowing any ad hoc adjustments to make theories
coincide with observed data.1

Thus, Popper's method

places much importance on the critical experiment, that
C op p e r recognizes that a theory may always be
adjusted to make it fit experimental outcomes. Ad hoc
adjustments are those that allow the theory to escape
refutation without adding any empirical or predictive
content, that is, counters experimental refutation but does
nothing to increase the theory's predictive power or expand
its set of logical consequents.
This idea of excess
content is also significant in Lakatos's philosophy.

particular, crucial test that may either help confirm or
falsify a theory.
Popper's method of science, therefore, offers a
rational

means to proceed with the development of

scientific theories
verificationism.

while recognizing problems with

Popper's views

on falsification raise

some interesting questions on the function and nature of
rhetoric should one implement his proposed method of
science.

The exchange of critical discourse between

scientists is an essential element of Popper's method of
conjectures and

refutations.

States Popper,

Faced with a certain problem, the scientist
offers, tentatively, some sort of solution— a
theory. This theory science accepts only
provisionally, if at all; and it is most
characteristic of the scientific method that
scientists spare no pains to criticize and test
the theory in question. Criticizing and testing
are complimentary activities; scientists
criticize the theory from many sides to reveal
weaknesses.
(Conjectures 313)
The rational aspect of this process enters in when these
vulnerable points are subjected to the severe scrutiny of
scientific testing.

Ultimately, for Popper, the process

not one ruled by rhetoric or argument, but rather by
scientists basing their theories and accepted knowledge o:
good reasons, good reasons derived by the refutation or
confirmation of theories based soundly in experimental
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outcome and observation.2

Yet, one sees the obvious

problem of denying the role of rhetoric considering
Popper's reliance on critical discourse.

Obvious questions

arise when one asks "Which of these good reasons is the
best reason?" and perhaps more significantly when one asks,
"When are the conditions of falsification met: how much
refutation is enough and how does one prove or communicate
this refutation?"

As shown in the timeline presented in

chapter one, for example, many scientists reported
confirmation of Fleischmann and Pons's findings while many
others found no evidence of cold fusion.

While it may be

possible to pursue a method of falsification as Popper
suggests, just when the actual theory has been falsified
returns to the realm of critical discourse; the ultimate
decision by the scientific community then must rest not
only on rational experimental outcome but, ultimately, upon
how one presents these outcomes through critical discourse
and communication.
Marilyn Schauer Samuels suggests further implications
of Popper's method on the rhetoric of scientific
communication in her article "Technical Writing and the

2This idea of "good reasons" will play a central role
in the method of analysis discussed in chapter 3. The good
reasons are in part the set of values and norms established
by a community of scientists by which they critically judge
discourse.
I will suggest that how well or how poorly
particular discourse addresses these good reasons (the
rhetorical element of discourse) influences success or
failure of theories.
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Recreation of Reality."

Her thesis is that technical

writing is a more creative venture than is commonly
thought, and that when writing, technical writers create
their particular versions of reality.
Though Samuels slightly misrepresents Popper, her
conclusion is nonetheless valid.

Popper does not, as she

suggests, advocate the "falsiflability of reality," but,
more precisely, the falsification of theories about
reality, for Popper advocates an objective reality revealed
through experimentation when our theories are falsified.
Also, Popper does not "advocate the on-going revisions of
reality as the aim of science," but rather that truth— in
the ultimate, objective sense— is the aim of science, and
that we move closer to that truth by uncovering the points
in our theories where an objective reality asserts itself
by disproving conjectures about its nature.

Samuels is

correct, however, in concluding that our conjectures and
refutations will result in an evolving depiction of
reality.

Scientists, as do the technical writers in her

thesis, depict their own versions of reality when positing
theories and debating these versions through critical
discourse.
Closely related to these ideas are the themes of
Popper's Objective Knowledge, which demonstrate the
scientific statement's significance in the practice of
science.

By objective knowledge, Popper does not mean
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knowledge produced without bias or subjectivity.

Rather,

for Popper, the scientific statement exists independently
of a knower,

just as a collection of books in a library

exists independently of a reader.

Further, this knowledge

would continue to exist even after humanity or anyone else
who could read it had long since vanished;
body of scientific statements exist.

so too does the

These statements have

an existence independent of reality, and it is upon this
body of knowledge that we apply our experimentations and
scrutinies.
It is not reality, then, that is subject to
falsifiability, but, as Charles Bazerman points out, it is
the scientific statement or theory that becomes the object
of scrutiny upon which critical operations may be performed
and the method of falsifiability applied (Scientific
Writing 159).

The implication is, as suggested, that

Popper's method of falsifiability is not applied to
reality;

it is removed one step from the critical

operations and direct observations of the laboratory and
experimentation and applied to the scientific statement
itself.

Thus, the significance of the scientific statement

is revealed in .Popper's method.
Another widely read and influential philosopher of
science
Research

is Imre Lakatos.

His "Methodology of Scientific

Programmes" outlines another rational approach to

the development

of scientific theories and knowledge.
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Lakatos disagrees with.

Popper on some fundamental points,

but builds his methodolgy

on the idea of

falsificationism— of a particular sort— and the

particular

application of this method, not to a single theory,

but to

a series of theories, or research program.
Lakatos maintains that it is unreasonable that a
scientist would abandon a theory because some observational
facts contradict i t .

There must be some greater reason for

the scientist to abandon one theory for another.

Lakatos

suggests that scientists move on to other theories only
when a better theory— "better" as defined by predicting
novel facts and possessing excess content— is offered.

For

Lakatos, there is no falsification before the emergence of
a better theory

(35).

Until that time, scientists will

continue testing the current theory.

The problem is

shifted, then, from one of appraising theories to
appraising a series of theories, or research program.
Lakatos maintains that great scientific achievements are
not outcomes based on hypotheses but on scientific research
programs.
A research program is built around two types of
heuristics.

The negative heuristic, or "hard core," forms

the set of major, underlying assumptions that are no longer
tested by scientists because such tests no longer yield
novel results.

For instance, a research program may be

established around Newton's three laws of motion.

The
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three laws themselves are unquestioned, so experiments that
test the three laws would not be considered fruitful
experimentation.

The positive heuristic constitutes the

set of auxiliary hypotheses surrounding the hard core and
functions as a sort of "protective belt."

For instance, if

a theory predicts outcome 0 and ~0 occurs, the positive
heuristic is adjusted; the assumptions of the negative
heuristic are not questioned.

It is possible that the

positive heuristic may in this manner undergo a problem
shift, scientists in the program focusing on different
research questions while maintaining the negative heuristic
as the guide to valid research (48-49).
Programs that yield theories which predict novel facts
or even generate new problems for investigation he terms
progressive research programs.

Programs that generate

theories which lack the ability to predict novel facts and
only accommodate previously unknown facts are termed
degenerative research programs.

Thus, progressive programs

are characterized by predictive power, degenerative
programs by only explanatory power.

Research programs

survive despite the rise of anomalies so long as they can
generate new problems.

When the program struggles simply

to explain anomalies, scientists begin to follow more
promising programs.

Thus, scientific progress is realized

not through falsification (because anomalies accompany any
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theory) but by progressive programs replacing degenerative
ones.
Still, the importance of discourse and the rhetorical
implications remain inherent in Lakatos's philosophy.

As

Bazerman suggests,
In order to communicate the point and value of
new work, the scientific writer would be well
advised to understand how his or her new
contribution fits within the continuity of the
problems of the relevant research program.
If
Lakatos is right, adherence to accepted theory is
not so necessary for an article's gaining
acceptance as is adherence to the current
research program....Thus an article that expands
a field's problems or redirects the research
program is more consequential for the development
of a science than the critical experiment that
would presumably falsify one theory and verify a
competing theory. (Scientific Writing 160)
To ensure success, then, scientific writers should learn
strategies for demonstrating that their work is in line
with the current program while showing explicitly how their
work opens new lines of investigation and thought.

Papers

that are interpretative in purpose, suggesting new
explanations for known anomalies, should be especially well
received.

However, interpretative papers that question the

negative heuristic would be less well received.
Scientists' reluctance to radically shift lines of
thought or investigation is revealed in the rhetorical
analysis of the cold fusion discourse, as well as evidence
that scientists resist interpretations that require an
adjustment to the negative heuristic.

Part of Fleischmann

and Pons's lack of success in their handling of cold fusion
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may be attributed to their failing to successfully convince
their audience that their evidence demonstrated a need to
re-think current fusion knowledge and lines of
investigation.
Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
is perhaps the most popular account of scientific
philosophy, particularly among humanities scholars.

This

popularity is due in part to Kuhn's likening the
development of science to that of other, more humanistic
fields.

He describes scientific development "as a

succession of tradition—bound periods punctuated by non—
cumulative breaks"

(Structure 208).

Thus, Kuhn presents a

revolutionary view of science based on his idea of the
disciplinary matrix.
Kuhn agrees with Popper in that much of science
proceeds by putting forth hypotheses that are
systematically tested in attempts to falsify them.
However, Kuhn terms such a view "a virtual cliche"
4).

("Logic"

Though such hypothesis testing constitutes "the

activity in which most scientists inevitably spend almost
all their time"

(Structure 6), Kuhn extends the notion by

placing such testing within a particular social structure
in the community of scientists and describing it as a
particular type of scientific activity.
Particular communities of scientists are united by
assumptions that the scientists have some idea of how the
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world works

(Structure 5), what Kuhn terms the disciplinary

matrix, "disciplinary, because it is common to the
practitioners of a specified discipline; matrix, because it
consists of ordered elements which require individual
specification" 3 ("Logic" 271).

The disciplinary matrix

includes "shared symbolic generalizations;... shared
models;...[and] shared values"

("Logic" 271-72).

The

disciplinary matrix defines a particular scientific
community or specialty and also defines valid research
problems and methods for solving those problems.
Thus, scientists involved in a particular community
spend most of their time practicing "normal science," that
is,
research firmly based upon one or more past
scientific achievements that some particular
scientific community acknowledges for a time as
supplying the foundation for its further
practice.
(Structure 10)
Kuhn has likened this period of normal science, that is,
the typical procedure of scientists, to puzzle— solving.
Unlike Lakatos, Kuhn believes that "the most striking
feature of... normal research problems... is how little they

3Kuhn coined the term "disciplinary matrix" as a
replacement for his term "paradigm," used in The Structure
of Scientific Revolutions. Masterman criticized Kuhn's use
of the term paradigm, counting "not less than twenty-one
different senses" in which the term was used (Masterman
61). Kuhn's switch to disciplinary matrix was intended to
"unravel confusions...that are entirely of my own making"
(Kuhn, Criticism 271). The many senses of the term
paradigm are subsumed under disciplinary matrix, defined in
the text above.
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aim to produce major novelties, conceptual or phenomenal"
(Structure 35).

Much of the puzzle—solving work is

intended to "add to the scope and precision" of the already
accepted views of the disciplinary matrix

(Structure 36).

Because of this puzzle—solving nature of normal
science, anomalies usually present little threat to the
disciplinary matrix.

Typically, it is the individual

scientist's own ingenuity, not the current theory or
disciplinary matrix that is tested.

If a particular

conjecture fails the test, it is the scientist's "own
ability not the corpus of current science [that] is
impugned...for in the final analysis it is the individual
scientist rather than current theory which is tested"
("Logic" 5).

Additionally, normal science progresses

rapidly because scientists only focus on those "problems
that only their own lack of ingenuity should keep them from
solving"

(Structure 37).

The puzzle—solving activities of normal science have
implications for scientific discourse as w e l l .

Philosophy

and many social sciences have been characterized by
critical discourse among the practitioners, discourse
concerned with claims, counterclaims,
fundamentals

("Logic" 6).

and debates over

However, during normal science

within a disciplinary matrix, such debate over fundamental
values and exemplars would be immaterial.
Kuhn,

According to
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it is precisely the abandonment of critical
discourse that marks the transition to a science.
Once a field has made that transition, critical
discourse recurs only at moments of crisis when
the bases of the field are again in jeopardy.
Only when they must choose between competing
theories do scientists behave like philosophers.
("Logic" 6)
In Kuhn's philosophy, not all science, however, is
normal science; such moments of crisis as mentioned above
do indeed arise.

These periods he refers to as

revolutions, when one disciplinary matrix is given up in
pursuit of another.
Kuhn explains why this shift occurs:
Sometimes a normal problem, one that ought to be
solved by known rules and procedures, resists the
reiterated onslaught of the ablest members of the
group within whose competence it falls. On other
occasions a piece of equipment designed and
constructed for the purpose of normal research
fails to perform in the anticipated manner,
revealing an anomaly that cannot, despite
repeated effort, be aligned with professional
expectation.
In these and other ways, normal
science repeatedly goes astray. And when it
does— when, that is, the profession can no longer
evade anomalies that subvert the existing
tradition of scientific practice— then begin the
extraordinary investigations that lead the
profession at last to a new set of commitments, a
new basis for the practice of science.
The
extraordinary episodes...are...scientific
revolutions. They are the tradition—shattering
complements to the tradition—bound activity of
normal science.
(Structure 5-6)
Periods of scientific revolution are the consequence of
normal science's puzzle—solving activities.

Though the aim

of normal science is not to produce novelties, its
activities are very effective in generating them.
explains,

As Kuhn
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normal science leads to a detail of information
and to a precision of the observation-theory
match that could be achieved in no other
way....Without the special apparatus that is
constructed mainly for anticipated functions, the
results that lead ultimately to novelty could not
occur. And even when the apparatus exists,
novelty ordinarily emerges only for the man who,
knowing with precision what he should expect, is
able to recognize that something has gone wrong.
(Structure 65)
Such revolutions are infrequent, momentous, and associated
with names such as Copernicus, Newton, and Einstein, each
of whom's theories "necessitated the community's rejection
of one time-honored scientific theory in favor of another
incompatible with it" (Structure 6).

This rejection of one

disciplinary matrix "is always simultaneously the decision
to accept another, and the judgement leading to that
decision involves the comparison of both paradigms with
nature and with each other"

(Structure 77).

Additionally, one characteristic of the new
disciplinary matrix is that its view of the world is
incompatible with the former matrix.

For instance, one

could not view the solar system as both geo—centric, as did
Ptolemy, and helio-centric, as did Copernicus; Newton's
three laws do not describe Einstein's world of relativity.
Kuhn explains further that in the shift from one matrix to
another,
words change their meanings or conditions of
applicability in subtle ways. Though most of the
same signs are used before and after a
revolution— e.g. force, mass, element, compound,
cell— the ways in which some of them attach to
nature has somehow changed.
Successive theories
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are thus, we say, incommensurable.
67)

("Logic" 266—

The implications for rhetorical discourse in Kuhn's
theory of science are many.

Though Kuhn states explicitly

that "it is precisely the abandonment of critical discourse
that marks the transition to a science"

("Logic" 6), I

believe that he refers to debate concerning the shared
values, assumptions, and exemplars of the disciplinary
matrix, not the specific outcomes of testing done under
normal science.

Indeed, it is the individual scientist's

own ingenuity and apparatus that is in doubt when
conjectures fail.

As I demonstrate in chapter three,

scientists frequently debate whether the correct apparatus
was used, whether the data were correctly interpreted,
whether the proper theory was evoked to interpret the data,
whether the most valid and reliable method was used, and so
on.

These issues might arise when scientists question

whether the shared values, methods, assumptions, and
exemplars defined by the disciplinary matrix were applied
correctly.

That is, while the content of the matrix is

unquestioned, the application of its content may be.
Further, Kuhn suggests that during periods of
revolution, critical discourse plays a central role,
scientists behaving much like philosophers as they debate
the merits of competing matrices.

Bazerman observes that

it is during periods of revolution that the nature of the
discourse changes most:
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At the height of revolution, writing should take
on a markedly argumentative, persuasive
character.
There should be clear evidence of
miscommunication between members of the two
matrices. The character of writing within a
disciplinary matrix also should change as it
loses or gains hold, either entering or leaving a
period of revolution. Finally...a writer at a
time of revolution would be wise to direct
comments not so much at his opponents as at
uncommitted third parties, such as young
scientists entering the field; the argument
should proselytize rather than attempt a
definitive answer to the opposition.
(Scientific
161- 62)

All three of the above philosophers, Popper, Lakatos,
and Kuhn, describe science in ways that differ in
assumptions and epistemology.

Popper's rational approach

of falsificationism; Lakatos' programs of scientific
research; and Kuhn's theory of normal science governed by
the disciplinary matrix that evoke periods of revolution
all demonstrate the importance of scientists' identifying
relevant issues and addressing them persuasively— that is,
satisfactorily— in communications with other scientists.

Rhetoric of Science
Much rhetorical scholarship of late has dealt directly
with the idea that scientific discourse has a rhetorical
element.

In this section I will review some representative

ideas to establish the current thinking about how
scientific discourse exhibits rhetorical characteristics.
James A. Berlin identifies several twentieth century
rhetorical positions, two of which embody the dichotomous
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stances described by Kelso above.

Berlin describes the

first such rhetorical stance as an "objective
rhetoric...based on a positivistic epistemology."

This

stance appears in twentieth century thinking in what Berlin
terms "current—traditional rhetoric"

(Rhetoric 7).

In this

rhetorical theory, reality exists in a material world, and
truth is arrived at "through collecting sense data and
arriving at generalizations."
of objectivity,

The observer's role is one

"necessitating the abandonment of social,

psychological, and historical preconceptions that might
interfere with the response of the faculties to the
external world."

Truth exists prior to and separately from

language, which can be either a "distorting mirror" when
reflecting external reality or, preferably,

"a transparent

device that captures the original experience," objectively
reproducing truth "conceived exclusively in empirical and
rational terms, with emotion and persuasion relegated to
oral discourse"

(Rhetoric 8).

From this particular stance,

scientists are viewed as producers of "truth" and
"scientific fact."
Berlin describes a second rhetorical stance, the New
Rhetoric, or Epistemic Rhetoric

("Contemporary" 773).

In

this rhetoric, language is present in every element of the
communicative transaction:

"interlocutor,

audience, and

material world are all regarded as verbal constructs."
this stance,

In

"there is never a division between experience
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and language....All experiences, even the scientific and
logical, are grounded in language, and language determines
their content and structure” (Rhetoric 16).

Thus, "all

truths arise out of dialectic, out of the interaction of
individuals within discourse communities"

(Rhetoric 17).

From this position, scientists are viewed as creators of
probable knowledge: "knowledge is not simply a static
entity available for retrieval.

Truth is dynamic and

dialectical, the result of a process" of communication
("Contemporary" 774).

Language, then, plays a central role

in scientific knowledge because "the elements of the
communication process.... form the elements that go into the
very shaping of knowledge"

("Contemporary" 774).

Both the current-traditional and epistemic rhetorics
make obvious a relationship between epistemological stance
and a rhetoric of science.

The former would seem to

preclude a rhetorical element in the creation of scientific
knowledge; the latter opens many possibilities.

However,

as will made more obvious throughout this literature
review, both the current-traditional and epistemic
rhetorics can be shown to agree with a model of scientific
practice that includes a rhetorical element.

This

agreement is discussed explicitly in this chapter's
treatment of epistemological concerns when it is shown that
a rhetoric of science can play a central role in creating
scientific knowledge even while maintaining a realist
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epistemology.

One can conclude, then, that a rhetoric of

science is not an epistemology of science, because a
rhetoric of science can agree with many epistemological
stances.

The implications of this conclusion are discussed

at length in chapter five.
Epistemology aside, Herbert W. Simons's verdict is
that "The donkey

[science] is rhetorical through and

through, but still capable of carrying a heavy load"
("Rhetors" 126).

He points out that in our society, the

term "rhetoric" has bad connotations, described by words
like "mere, only, empty, or worse," so scientists
understandably avoid an association.

In the classical,

non—pejorative sense, however, rhetoric connotes "reasongiving activity on judgmental matters about which there can
be no formal proof"

("Rhetors" 127).

This classical sense

permits and even encourages the concept of rhetoric as good
reason-giving on matters of judgment.
Simons decides that this latter sense is what
promoters of science mean by "scientific objectivity"
("Rhetors" 128).

Popper, Simons points out, suggests that

what sets scientific discourse apart from ordinary rhetors
is this "error—correcting process of exchange between
scientists"

("Rhetors" 116).

Popper calls for the

unrestrained criticism of any and all ideas, and so insists
that theories be stated in a manner in which they can be
falsified or tested ("Rhetors" 116).

Simons concludes,
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then, that the rhetorical practices of scientists are kept
in check by Popper's notion of free criticism.
Simons further observes that the rhetorician also can
aid science in this error-correcting process in serving as
critic of discourse.

Simons suggests that

rather than carping at science in general,
rhetorical critics would be more persuasive were
they to reserve their slings and arrows for more
limited and vulnerable targets such as individual
practitioners or communities in the time-bound
sense.
Of special concern should be willful
violations of scientific canons, and here critics
can stand not as enemies of science, but as
defenders of its time—honored norms. ("Rhetors"
128-129)
From a perspective "friendly" to science, he concludes that
"there is also much theoretical work to be done"
129) .

("Rhetors"

In the cold fusion controversy, Fleischmann and Pons

violated several standards of scientific behavior, such as
the announcement by press conference rather than peerreviewed medium.

How these violations may have contributed

to the controversy is an important rhetorical concern.
Scholars of rhetoric have found much evidence that
writers of science employ rhetoric in their communications
to establish the importance of a line of research, to
demonstrate how their findings fit with accepted standards
of investigation, and to undermine opposing theoretical
interpretations.

For example, Carol Reeves, in her study

of reports in the New England Journal of Medicine that
announced the discovery of immunodeficiency in homosexual
patients, found that writers use rhetorical strategies to

emphasize the importance of their claims and suggested
lines of investigation.

The writers she examined first

established AIDS as a mysterious new phenomenon, presenting
symptoms that current medical knowledge was unable to
explain.

Later, though, the writers relied on existing

knowledge to explain the phenomenon, demonstrating that the
immuno-deficiency caused by the virus was not surprising
under the circumstances and may in fact be solvable.

This

strategy brings to mind Kuhn's theory, above, in which he
suggests the appeal that puzzle—solving has for scientists,
but also the requirement that the puzzle appear solvable
through the scientists' ingenuity.

Reeves further points

out that establishing and validating a new phenomenon in a
given community or discipline is an important question for
rhetorical study.

She cites sociologist Robert Merton who

identifies the "political dimension" involved in the
competition to be the first to characterize and establish a
phenomenon:

"With varying degrees of intent, groups in

conflict want to make their interpretations the prevailing
one of how things were and are and will be"

(395).

This

political dimension arises in the cold fusion controversy
as well, for the attempt to be first to lay claim to the
cold fusion phenomenon is one possible reason why
Fleischmann and Pons made their initial announcement by
press conference.
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This theme of competition and its manifestation in
rhetoric arises again in Andrew J. Weigert's article, "The
Immoral Rhetoric," and also indicates the relationships
between the philosophy, sociology, and rhetoric of science.
He cites Kuhn, who suggests that "the triumph of theory
depends on the number of practitioners who are persuaded to
utilize it."

Thus, he argues, a theoretical rhetoric

arises in scientific papers that is aimed at weakening the
explanatory power of rival theories.

For instance, in

research articles, the literature is selectively reviewed
to emphasize corroborative findings.

The need to persuade

and answer objections from others in the discipline
imperceptibly transforms the exponent of a theory into a
proponent of it.

To invest one's intellectual life in the

exposition of a theory is to communicate an evaluation of
it.

Theoreticians who claimed that their theories were no

better than others would open themselves to questions
concerning their reasonableness and credibility within the
community of scientists.

The observing community assumes

that the scientist believes in the theory; otherwise, why
would so much time be invested in it?

Thus, even the

exponent of a theory seeks to persuade the readers (113).
Weigert concludes that "whatever its scientific rationale,
reconstructed logic functions rhetorically as a form of
persuasion.... If the reconstructed logic is successful, the
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scientific act is persuasively presented in a way in which
it did not in fact take place"

(113).

In his article "Rhetoric and Science:
Distinction,"

Notes for a

Don Geiger echoes Kelso by suggesting how,

after the classical stance, that rhetoric and science are
distinct enterprises, yet can be made complementary to one
another.

In a sense, rhetoric is "a means of communication

of some value in the solution of certain kinds of social
problems"

(54).

Rhetoric is the means of identifying truth

with feelings; or, as Aristotle suggested,

"Rhetoric... is

essentially the art of giving effectiveness to the truth"
(54).

Science, then, is to find the truth; rhetoric, to

energize it.

"Rhetoric," Geiger contends,

"has widened its

scope, and instead of being regarded as a narrow art of
persuasion, is now concerned with the proper presentation
of all knowledge"

(54).

David Edge and Nigel C. Gilbert found that scientists
also use rhetoric to show that their work fits with and
agrees with current lines of research and knowledge.

They

examined an objectified, quantitative analysis of
scientific communication called the citation analysis,
which studies the references used by writers.

Though

citation analysis seems at first to belong more to a
discussion of the sociology of science, this review of both
Edge and Gilberts' work will reveal that a quantitative
analysis of scientific interaction fails in part because of
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the rhetorical nature of scientific discourse, specifically
a persuasive use of referencing, or citation.
Edge asserts that proponents maintain that "citation
analysis has been demonstrated to be a valid and valuable
means of creating accurate historical descriptions of
scientific fields"

(109).

Two uses of citation analysis

are, one, the determination of influence of one or more
researchers on another researcher.
so on.
work.

A will cite B and C and

Such citation indicates that B and C influenced A's
A second use is the determination and identification

of what Diana Crane has termed "invisible colleges," social
groups of scientists with similar interests, research
methods, and aims.
The proponents of citation analysis contend its
benefit is systematic and objective analysis, one that may
even eliminate the human element from such analysis.

For

instance, all data found in Science Citations could be
entered into a computer, which would then be programmed to
do all the groupings and analysis.

Edge criticizes this

notion of purely objective analysis. For example, by taking
the analysis out of human hands, a participant's own
accounts that B's work was not influential on his or her
own would either have to be ignored or the citation
analysis would have to be corrected.
Additionally, Edge suggests that there exists both
formal and informal communication among scientists; that
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is, communication may take place that references do not
record.

The formal communication upon which citation

analysis

depends "is the tip of the

Further,

Edge raised

citation

analysis is the persuasive use of citation, which

the

iceberg"

(113) .

issue thata major problem with

Nigel C. Gilbert explores.
Gilbert also examined citation analysis.

He

identifies three uses to which citation analysis has been
put:

using the number of citations a paper or researcher

receives as an indicator of significance or "worth";
mapping disciplines or specialties; and constructing
typologies of varieties of reference and citation by
content analysis of the citations.

Gilbert points out that

while some interesting contributions have been made by such
analyses, care should be taken when dealing with such
because no explicit or accepted theory underlies their use,
and thus no reasoning exists that can explain why some
authors cite others.

Gilbert offers some ideas, however.

Current explanations about why scientists use citation
as they do explains inadequately why scientists often cite
1) references that are "negational in character (that is,
those references to papers which the author wishes to
challenge or contradict" and 2) references that seem not
strictly relevant to the author's present research.
However, if one were to consider the scientific article as
persuasive and assume that the scientist who has obtained
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results he believes to be important and true must convince
his colleagues of such— and by that share his opinion of
the value of his work— such questions as the above are more
satisfactorily answered.

Gilbert suggests that references

help demonstrate the validity and significance of the work
presented in scientific papers.
To gain recognition for new findings, scientists must
demonstrate that 1) their work represents an advance on
past research;

2) their findings relate to current

research in the field; 3) their work is free of error and
uses proper theories and techniques; and 4) alternative,
contradictory hypotheses have been considered and
discarded.

Some of the above are accomplished through

argument and inference detailed in the body of the paper;
the latter suggests a clear relationship between scientific
and persuasive discourse.

Citation of references, since

they have already been incorporated into the body of valid
knowledge, represents a measure of persuasive support
(116).

It follows that it would be more persuasive to cite

an accepted paper than to redescribe the research without
reference to the original paper.
Scientists, then, use those respected papers to
bolster acceptance, give justification, and demonstrate the
novelty of their work, as well as indicate how one's own
work illuminates or solves problems raised by previously
accepted work (116).

Thus, scientists tend only to cite

53

papers they decide that their audience will consider
"important and correct" in established fields, even if the
citation is not directly related to one's own work.
Gilbert's arguments recall Lakatos' philosophy, which
suggests that to be successful, scientists must demonstrate
how their work fits into and advances the research program.
Charles Bazerman analyzed research articles dealing
with spectroscopy that appeared from the late 1800's to
present. His most interesting findings were about the
changing epistemology of the articles and how this change
was evident in the rhetoric of the discourse.

Bazerman

concludes that
the large-scale trends revealed...are consistent with
the traditional view that science is a rational,
cumulative, corporate enterprise, but point out that
this enterprise is realized only through linguistic,
rhetorical, and social choices, all with
epistemological consequences.
(Shaping 183)
While early articles focused on methodology, more modern
writing takes on a more interpretative and problem-solving
posture, thus opening the possibilities for scientific
rhetoric.
For example, an 1893 article that Bazerman examined
employs a rhetoric based on empiricist epistemology.

The

main concern of the article is with methodological
techniques, which are discussed in great detail (Shaping
177) .
In 1950, a new style of argument appears that will be
more fully developed in a 19 60 article:

the modelling

approach.

Epistemologically, the modelling approach

recognizes a split between nature and theory, theory being
a human construction, having no reasonable expectation of
giving a full or accurate account of nature

(Shaping 181) .

Under this approach, a paper can only propose a model that
accounts for the data better than other models.
of argument structure,

In terms

a modelling article does not present

a claim at first to be explained, supported, and discussed
in light of experimental data; instead, once the article
locates the problem in relevant theory and presents
appropriate data, only then does it offer its model or
claim about what apparently occurred in the experiment.
Results are first presented, then puzzled over.

Only after

the puzzlement is the provisionally best model offered
(Shaping 181).
Once the argument moves away from notions of absolute
truth and error, the concept of fit between theory and data
becomes more important.

Thus, 1970 finds articles locating

their problems in the deteriorating quality of fit between
theory and data; a new theory gains ground because it
improves that fit.

The experiment is designed to find the

cause of the discrepancy.

The article ends by calling for

new theory and experimental work

(Shaping 181).

By 1980, articles have become increasingly tentative
about the certainty and epistemological status of their
claims

(Shaping 181). For instance, the spectroscopic
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community became gradually more organized and unified by
the common bond of theory and theory testing;

it relied on

the common theory to produce experimental problems and
relied more upon and referred more to each others' work.
"As quantum mechanics became more established, it provided
a coherent organizing principle for work and argument, and
the practicing spectroscopist had to attend to the
relationship between his own work and others "and show how
his work fit in to the current research program"
181).

(Shaping

This concept is central to Imre Lakatos's philosophy

of science, discussed above, in which programs of research
flourish when its member scientists identify new avenues of
thought and investigation.
As theory grew, Bazerman observes, it became apparent
that it was a construction, separate from the nature it
described, and
social relations

this awareness affected argument as well as
(Shaping 183).

This review of rhetoric of science scholarship reveals
the importance of rhetoric in the practice of science.

For

example, the rhetoric and philosophy of science are
strongly linked. Scientists look to the way science
operates to structure their writing and inform their
rhetoric, using rhetoric to accomplish important tasks as
defined by the philosophy of science, such as redirecting
current lines of thought and research.

Also apparent is a

relationship between epistemology and rhetoric;

as Bazeman
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suggests, epistemological assumptions influence and are
reflected in the rhetoric.

Further, the modern sense of

rhetoric employs a wide applicability, becoming enmeshed
with the way scientists produce and properly present truth.
The next section will examine the relationship of the
rhetoric of science with the sociology of science.

Sociology of Science
The social forces at work within specific scientific
communities, or specialties,

can influence the form,

content, and dissemination of scientific discourse.
Discussion of the philosophy of science has suggested the
importance of scientists' identifying relevant issues and
addressing them in their discourse.

These issues are

products not only of the philosophical aspects of doing
science but the social as well.

Kuhn's philosophy

especially emphasized the importance of the shared values
and assumptions of the disciplinary matrix.

This matrix

may be defined not only philosophically, but also
sociologically as the values and standards upheld by the
particular community of scientists.

Thus, the idea that

successful communicators in science must identify and
address the issues and concerns of the specific community
is not exclusive to philosophy.
For instance, Medwar discusses the possibility that the
scientific research article may misrepresent the thoughts
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that gave rise to it (42).

The form that the paper takes

is meant to reflect a particular procedure of scientific
activity, so that, in effect, it demonstrates to the
scientific community that the writer actually followed the
procedure valued by that community (even though the writer
may not have).

He posits that the prototypical research

article embodies a mistaken, yet pervasive, concept of the
nature of scientific thought.
For example, the structure of the research article is
introduction, previous work, methods, results, and then
discussion.

In the results section, for instance, one must

refrain from discussing the importance of the findings and
pretend that the mind is an empty vessel ready to receive
information (a practice which Fleischmann and Pons failed
to follow, as discussed in chapter four's analysis).

In

the discussion section, the writer must "adopt the
ludicrous pretense of asking yourself if the information
you have collected means anything"

(42).

The underlying

concept is a scientific process in which generalizations
grow from simple, unbiased, unprejudiced observation: from
an unordered collection of data, an orderly, general
statement will develop.
However, all scientific work begins with an
expectation— a hypothesis— about the outcome of an inquiry.
This hypothesis governs the shape of the inquiry, even
though in their genesis, "hypotheses arrive by guesswork"
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{43).

In light of this expectation, some outcomes are

deemed relevant and others are not; some methods are chosen
and discarded; and some experiments done rather than
others.

This behavior is apparent in the cold fusion

experiments by both Fleischmann and Pons and Jones.
Fleischmann and Pons, as electrochemists, arranged 2 of
their 4 experiments to measure excess heat while failing to
look for other kinds of evidence of fusion.

Jones, a

physicist, looked only for neutrons, but one type of fusion
evidence, using a neutron detector of his own design.
Apparent in these experimental designs are underlying
assumptions about relevant experiments and evidence.
Considering this general behavior, Medwar concludes
that the inductive format of the scientific paper should be
discarded; the discussion should come first, and then the
data, and scientists should not be ashamed to admit, as
they apparently are, "that their hypotheses appeared
uncharted in their minds," and that they are "imaginative
and inspirational in character, that they are indeed
adventures of the mind"

(43).

Not only is form influenced by social forces within a
scientific community, but also content, especially when one
substitutes the concept "audience" for scientific
community, as Michael A. Overington has done.

His thesis

is that scientific activity "may be treated rhetorically
because the construction of scientific knowledge involves
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argumentation before an audience"

(144) .

Overington posits

four stages in the production of scientific knowledge that
link four rhetorical concepts to the sociology of science:
1. The education of young scientists transforms
them into licensed speakers about matters that
concern their communities.
2.
Scientists engage themselves in research
situations that are necessary conditions for
their speech.
3. As a result of their engagement in research,
scientists construct and publish arguments which offer
plausible reasons to their audiences for judging the
conclusions of these persuasions to be valid.
4. Over periods of time scientific audiences
provide authoritative judgment on the status of
these arguments as scientific knowledge.
(154)
Chapter three discusses the importance of and manner in
which scientific writers,

as identified in three, above,

"offer plausible reasons to their audiences for judging the
conclusions of these persuasions to be valid," an argument
essential for a rhetoric of science.
Bazerman suggests that, regarding writing, the
constraints and opportunities provided by the specific
genre and style at any particular time and within a
particular discipline are determined by a collection of
social factors.

The individual writer, in making decisions

concerning persuasion, must write within a form that
considers the audience's current expectations of
appropriate writing within that field.

These expectations

provide resources as well as constraints, for they provide
guides to the formulation of an argument, and suggest ways
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of presenting material that might not have occurred to the
writer's imagination otherwise

(Shaping 165) .

Bazerman further contends that the conventions of
writing within a discipline are as much a product of that
discipline as are its knowledge claims

(Shaping 16 6).

Moreover, since the institutional arrangements of writing
conventions directly affect the symbolic representations
that constitute knowledge, writing conventions help create
the very thing called "knowledge"

(Shaping 166).

How a

discipline decides to communicate with itself, what it
presents as potential contributions to knowledge, and how
it conceives and argues for those potential contributions
are essential parts of how a discipline constitutes itself
in fulfillment of its task of creating knowledge (Shaping
166) .
Lyne and Howe also suggest that distinct fields of
discourse exist within the sciences and can complicate
communication. Because researchers within different
specialties hold different assumptions, a scientist's
venture beyond the strictest confines of a research
specialty will sometimes lead to misunderstanding (133).
Key misunderstandings may arise when writers attempt to
graft rhetorical constructs of one specialty onto another
(139).

Whether miscommunication between disciplines

occurred in the cold fusion controversy is an important
consideration for investigation.

Pons and Fleischmann are
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electrochemists; many critics of both the experiments and
experimenters were nuclear and particle physicists.

If

Lyne and Howe are correct, one would expect to find some
degree of miscommunication between members of the different
specialties.

This question is explored in—depth in

chapters four and five.
Frank E. Millar also addresses the theme of knowledge
creation and argues that science is part of a critical
approach to knowledge.

The scientific knowledge claim is

an expression of organized experience; that is, it is
repetitive, repeatable, redundant, predictable.

Thus the

quest for creating knowledge— which is always created, not
discovered— is the quest for organizing experience.

The

elucidation and communication of these patterns is what
makes knowledge and education possible.

Millar contends

that "the societal function of science is no less than the
description of social illusions people live by at any point
in time.... Scientists do not deal with truth; they deal
with limited and approximate descriptions of reality"
(227) .
W. R. Albury found that not only are scientific
theories sometimes scrutinized in the academic forum, but
often in the public forum as well.

For example, the

Sociobiology Study Group (SSG) of Science for the People
attacked E. 0. Wilson's theories that dealt with a genetic
basis for racial differences, comparing them to Naziism.
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Though the scientific value or validity of Wilson's genetic
theories did not enter into any criticisms, the fact that
his study dealt with racial differences based upon genetics
was enough to bring the theory into disrepute.
This issue of criticism directed at theories or
scientists by those outside the field is addressed in
chapters four and five.

Fleischmann and Pons show concern

about the many negative comments directed at them by the
press

("Calorimetric" 669);

negative editorials about cold

fusion and Fleischmann and Pons also appeared in Nature,
often alongside original research articles.

Since research

scientists were just as likely to see articles skeptical of
cold fusion as they were confirming or non—confirming
research articles, one wonders how such criticism by the
journal's non-scientific community influenced those
scientists.
Philip C. Wander asserts that "the archetypal speaking
situation for the scientist occurs in addressing an
audience of fellow scientists, and the archetypal form of
discourse is the research report"

(230).

He argues that

the scientific report must do more than just give
information; it must persuade as well.

For instance, the

scientist must first convince the editorship of the journal
that the subject is worthwhile, that the scientist knows
what he or she is talking about, and that the findings can
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be integrated into current knowledge

(230), echoing

Lakatos.
Such an argument further raises questions about the
publication process's influence on scientific discourse and
its distribution.

Diana Crane, in her article "The

Gatekeepers of Science," states that the norms of
scientific conduct require that a scientist's social
characteristics be left out of the publication decision.
However, she points out studies that suggest that the
evaluation of scientific articles is not entirely
objective, that a scientific stratification system acts
differentially to distribute publication opportunities to
particular scientists, opportunities that play an important
role in a scientist's success.
For instance, Crane asserts that some studies suggest
that many published articles are written by scientists at
major universities,

suggesting that selection of articles

is influenced by academic affiliations.

One 1945 study

showed that articles from authors at minor universities
were rejected more frequently by The American Sociological
Review than those by authors at major universities.
Crane found further that the distribution of
characteristics such as academic affiliation, doctoral
origin, and professional age of contributors was
essentially the same distribution as those among the
journal editors.

She suspects that most instances,
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however, are due not to explicit prejudices but to editors
responding to characteristics in the writing of those with
similar academic training, methodologies, theoretical
orientations, and modes of expression (200).
This conclusion confirms the idea that has pervaded
the discussion on philosophy and sociology thus far:

that

communities of scientists share certain values, concerns,
and assumptions.

Discourse, then, which reflects and

successfully and persuasively addresses these shared
values, concerns, and assumptions should be more likely to
meet with success than discourse that ignores and/or fails
to address such issues.

One can imagine, then, a

rhetorical method of scientific discourse that could
identify heuristics that scientists could follow to
increase the likelihood of acceptance of a research
article, both by colleagues and journal editors.

One could

imagine further that, armed with such a heuristic, a
rhetorical critic may analyze how well or how poorly a
scientist has identified relevant issues and addressed them
in his or her discourse.

These imaginings I attempt to

make substantial in chapter three of this study.
Alfred de Grazia further emphasizes the role of the
scientific reception system, and thus the importance of
scientific discourse, in the doing of science.

He goes so

far as to suggest that "when a scientist writes a book of
his controlled experiences, a publisher ponders its
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audience, and a colleague weighs its value, the special
order of human relations called science is in being"

(45).

The behaviors of the individuals involved follow common
human patterns, and so do their motives:

one can't

separate the scientist from the person and the person from
society and its behaviors at large.

Likewise in science,

as in every social order, there exists a reception system.
The system in science is the same as in any social order:
it "shapes the character of the new recruits to the order
and therefore forms the product of the order"

(45).

He

suggests, as does Crane, that journal editors are the
"gatekeepers" of science, screening the information that is
permitted to circulate widely among members of the
discipline and tending to support the currently orthodox
views in their fields.

Their receptivity to new ideas is

variable.
De Grazia characterizes several reception systems, one
of which he terms the Rationalistic Reception System, based
on the scientific method.

"Its goal is truth,

enlightenment, knowledge, or just simply 'science'" (46).
The model itself denies a sociology of science; the idea
that scientists are conditioned by social factors that lie
outside their intellect is dismissed in this view: an
objective method exists for testing reality, and anyone
confronted with the truth will recognize it immediately.
In this rationalistic doctrine, the rule of the publication
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holds primary importance: every scientist has the right to
publish and should review results with peers before
submission.
Several other rules are at work in the Rationalistic
Reception System.
judgment is passed.

One holds that works must be read before
Another holds that theories offered

should be tested, not only by their authors but by their
critics.

Honesty and fairness are also a credo.

"Unless

scientists are willing to admit the source of their
knowledge and theories, and willing to grant a fair hearing
and test to ideas brought forth, they contribute to the
collapse of the rationalistic reception system"

(48).

De

Grazia further observes that "the model of rationality
demands that the populous be barred

from scientific

proceedings..-the implication

being that unless a work has

the previous blessings of the

scientific establishment,

has no right to exist"

it

(4 9).

If de Grazia's conclusion is correct, Fleischmann and
Pons seem ill-fated from the start, having violated several
rules of the Rationalistic Reception System.

Their results

on cold fusion underwent no sort of peer review before
being made public;
critics;

their theories were thus untested by

Pons and Fleischmann refused to release their

apparatus for investigation, nor did they release enough
detail to allow other scientists to replicate their
experiment;

and news of their findings was made at a
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public press conference rather than in a scientific
journal.

Needless to say, their work had not earned, as de

Grazia states, "the previous blessings of the scientific
establishment."

De Grazia would conclude then that their

work had "no right to exist."

The details of Pons and

Fleischmann's behavior and the possible implications of
their violating nearly every rule of the rationalistic
reception system

will be discussed at length in chapters

four and five.

Rhetoric of Inquiry
"The Rhetoric of Inquiry will change the way we think
about the way we think," concludes Herbert W. Simons after
attending the four—day 1984 University of Iowa symposium on
Rhetoric and the Human Sciences.

An emerging discipline,

the rhetoric of inquiry concerns itself with the use of
rhetoric in the communication practices of research
disciplines of all kinds, whether scientific, humanistic,
or mathematical.

This

discipline is based on the

assumption that all fields of human inquiry have as their
basis argument and persuasion.

As Nelson states,

Scholarship uses argument, and argument uses
rhetoric.
The 'rhetoric' is not mere ornament or
manipulation or trickery.
It is rhetoric in the
ancient sense of persuasive discourse.
In
matters from mathematical proof to literary
criticism, scholars write rhetorically. Only
occasionally do they reflect on that fact.
(Rhetoric 3)
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Further, a central concept is that rarely, if ever, do
facts speak for themselves:
[scientists] do
them"

"facts themselves are mute,

the speaking—

(Nelson, Rhetoric 8).

whether through them or for

If scientific discourse is at

the root persuasive, argumentative communication, a clearer
understanding of the functions of rhetoric in scientific
fields will "make the sciences more intelligible to
themselves and others"

(Nelson, Rhetoric 5).

In their

article "The Rhetoric of Inquiry: Projects and Prospects,"
Nelson and Megill engage in what they term "an exercise in
communication across fields, an attempt to explain and
advance a line of investigation they call rhetoric of
inquiry"

("Projects" 20).

They relate briefly the story of

the thinkers prior to the seventeenth century who regarded
rhetoric as the prime domain of language and argument.
Since then, rhetoric has played a small role in Western
thought.

They observe that rhetoric has become "at best a

technology useful to politicians or others who wish to win
friends or influence people, but trivial in its own right"
("Projects" 20).
The rhetoric of inquiry urges scholars to overcome any
insistence on certainties either needed or achieved.
Nelson and Megill suggest that in scholarship, as with all
human activities,

accepting uncertainties can often produce

a greater appreciation of questions and complexities.
inquiry, such a stance allows an understanding of the

In
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diverse standards and strategies of the sciences on their
own levels.

The rhetoric of inquiry insists on connecting

the process of science not only to its logic and method,
but additionally to its aesthetics, economics, histories,
and sociologies.

Insisting that even academic reasoning is

practical reasoning, it situates research in uncertain but
actual communities of human experience.

"It reminds

scholars that rhetoric was the first, and in some respects,
remains the foremost science of the human communities"
("Projects" 25).
The rhetoric of inquiry has the power to dispel
dichotomies among the humanities and social sciences by
comparing different arenas and strategies of inquiry, thus
helping independent projects learn from the results and
principles of others

(35).

It may encourage scholars to

radically rethink their disciplines by revealing the ways
in which the sciences rely not less upon but differently
upon rhetoric than do the humanities.

It should not be a

distinct field, although specialization is inevitable.

It

must grow and gain strength from and be informed by the
interaction of disciplinary research and inquiry,
interaction that is necessary to ensure the quality of its
analysis and the authority of its advice

("Projects" 35).

Its goal is to explain how scholars legitimately invoke
different reasons persuasively in different contexts

(35).
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John Lyne describes the 1984 Iowa Symposium on
Rhetoric and the Human Sciences in his article "Rhetorics
of Inquiry."

Lyne reports that while no single definition

of rhetoric was evident at the symposium, four identifiable
lines of thought emerged from the symposium by which one
may characterize the function of rhetoric in relation to
academic inquiry.
1)

Rhetoric as Argument:

Rhetoric may be considered

the argumentative practice particular to each academic
paradigm, the stuff of which argument is made and which is
then taken as a source of knowledge within the several
human sciences (66).

One area of research is whether the

sources of disagreement in the human sciences differ in
kind from those issues found in the hard sciences.

Lyne

asserts that the persistence of disagreement among equally
competent experts confounds the model of inquiry as simple
mastery of the craft (67).
2)

Rhetoric as Configuration:

The literary studies'

approach to rhetoric is reemerging, sharing with the
communication field "the common ground of narrativity,
metaphor, and figuration" and owing to contemporary
theories of meaning that have undermined the
literal/figurative and fact/fiction dichotomies (69).

If

one grants a world socially constructed, "constituted of
arbitrary signs in ideological formations read like a
text...there is little to distinguish between literature
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and the discourses of 'the real world'"

(69).

The manner

in which academia builds its knowledge claims through
figurative language is a growing area of study.
3) Rhetoric as Critical Practice:

The oft—voiced

concern for what happens to objectivity if one concedes a
persuasive role to rhetoric in the structure of inquiry is
just one part of the broader concern about error and
accountability.

No one should deny the possibility of

being somehow subject to correction.

Any speech act should

be accountable to the world in which it is produced.
Criticism is one method to maintain that accountability,
and it is a function of rhetoric.

Correction and

accountability need not presuppose fixed standards; an
ongoing, evolving dialogue among research paradigms will
demand both (69).
4)

Rhetoric as a Means of Empowerment:

Scholar

Gerald Bruns has observed that rhetoric originated as a
means of enabling people to gain power over situations
(70).

Perhaps the greatest benefit of studying the

rhetoric of inquiry will be its ability to explain somewhat
the relationship between power and knowledge.

We might

gain a better understanding of how power relations are
enhanced, changed, or diluted by the rhetorical development
of "knowledge"

(70).

Lyne suggests the study of any of the above areas of
rhetoric might contribute to an overarching purpose of
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making academic discourses better serve public needs,
"enriching rather than denuding the grounds of public
understanding and decision"

(70).

How might one recover wisdom in a modern,
technological age in which the various research specialties
shield themselves from public judgements through use of
self—isolating vocabularies and territorial claims of
expertise?

If rhetoricians can begin to get a sense of the

rhetorical practices of the these specialties, it may be
possible to "make the discourses of academic knowledge
better mesh with public life"

(70-71) .

Simons also offers his commentary on the symposium,
writing that it "may well be remembered as a watershed
event in the history of rhetoric"

("Chronicle" 52).

Panelists included McCloskey, an economist; Megill, a
historian; Nelson, a political scientist; Thomas S. Kuhn; a
science historian and philosopher; and Richard Rorty, a
philosopher.

Those attending experienced a shared

excitement and agreed they were attending an event whose
time had come.
The symposium challenged several objectivist notions:
the correspondence theory of truth; the mind as a "glassy
essence"; scientific language as a mirror of reality; and
verification as well as falsification as demarcation
criteria for a "true" science.

Some panelists, such as

Richard Rorty, questioned the notion of epistemology itself
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("Chronicle" 53).

The challenges cut across many

disciplines: history, women's studies, literary criticism,
theology, and law.

These challenges to long-held and

prevailing notions have resulted in intensified critical
attention to the language and logic of the human sciences
that lead inevitably to their use of rhetoric ("Chronicle"
53).

Geertz referred to a "refiguration of social thought"

("Chronicle" 53), both here and abroad, catalyzed by a
shift from technology imageries to metaphors and analogies
taken from the humanities.

In the "new metalanguage" of

the human sciences,
behaviors, cultures, entire historical epochs might be
viewed as texts, scientific data as symbolic
constructions, scientific theories and descriptions as
narratives, mathematical proofs as rhetorical tropes,
and the ongoing activities of scientific communities
as conversations.
("Chronicle" 53)
Richard Rorty is the philosophic spokesperson for the
rhetoric of inquiry.

In his piece "Science as Solidarity,"

he accurately describes our culture as one that considers
synonymous the concepts of science, rationality,
objectivity, and truth.

As such, science becomes a

religion of sorts: the scientist replaces the priest as the
one who promises to deliver abstract, ultimate truth.

As a

result, any discipline that wants to be taken seriously
must imitate science.

Disciplines with names like "human

science" or "behavioral science" or "political science"
arise and seek ways to incorporate the rationality and
objectivity of scientific methods into their own.
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If science is to be emulated, however, it should not
be because scientists are "more 'objective' or 'logical' or
'methodical' or 'devoted to the truth' than other people'"
(45).

Rather, it is because science is a "model of human

solidarity"

(46).

The "goal of inquiry...[is] the

attainment of an appropriate mixture of unforced agreement
with tolerant disagreement"

(48).

It is the atmosphere

that promotes free and open debate that fuels human
inquiry.

A more productive pursuit to advance human

knowledge is possible through a new mind-set achieved
through a shift in vocabulary that reveals that scientists
should be emulated because of the way they utilize free and
open criticism.
For instance, a popular notion of scientific
rationality naming beforehand the criteria by which a
hypothesis will be declared disconfirmed (recall Popper's
philosophy of science) and be prepared to discard the
hypothesis under such conditions.
from this thinking.

However, problems arise

For instance,

It is characteristic of democratic and
pluralistic societies to continually redefine
their goals. But if to be rational means to
satisfy criteria, then this process of
redefinition is bound to be nonrational. So if
[this process] is to be viewed as
rational... rationality will have to be thought of
as something other than the satisfaction of
criteria which are statable in advance.
(40)
However, if we then define rational in its other sense, as
"sane" or "reasonable," rather than "methodical," the term

represents a set of moral principles: "tolerance, respect
for the opinions of those around one, willingness to
listen, reliance on persuasion rather than force"

(40).

When thought of as such, a dichotomy between the rational
and irrational has little relevance toward distinctions
between hard and soft sciences.

It has more to do with a

method that "eschews dogmatism, defensiveness, and
righteous indignation"

(40).

It has to do with blurring

the distinctions between objective and subjective and fact
and value that the criterial definition of rationality
promotes.

"Truth," suggests Rorty, is what will win out in

an atmosphere of free and open debate, an atmosphere that
promotes the moral principles referred to above.

For

"objective," we should substitute "unforced agreement," for
included in such a substitute is the guarantee given for
any "objective" observation, namely, intersubjective
verification.

Thus, Rorty concludes that "the best way to

find out what to believe is to listen to as many
suggestions and arguments as you can"

(4 6).

Epistemoloqical Questions
Suggesting that the practice of science is, at least
in part, rhetorical eventually raises epistemological
concerns:
claims?

What, then, is the status of existing knowledge
How can we then ever hope to discover truth or

what is real?

How do essentially subjective,
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individualistic arguments interface with the objective
universe?
Such questions retain as their basis the traditional
dichotomy between rhetoric and science, especially evident
in questions such as the latter.

What is becoming clearer

is that through rhetoric scientists are able to reach a
consensus about what is reasonably true about the workings
of nature.
At the outset, questions about epistemology and
ontology may be addressed most easily by arguing that such
concerns are actually a red herring:

the manner in which

scientists convince as opposed to of what they convince are
different issues.

My examination in chapter four of the

rhetoric involved in the cold fusion controversy is not
intended to answer the question,

"Is cold fusion a

reality?" or "Is what Pons and Fleishman observed actually
cold nuclear fusion?"

Rather, the goal of my study is to

explain the use of rhetoric in scientific communication and
the "doing of science."

Whether scientists make direct

observations of reality, whether they have access to
directly observable phenomena through undistorted views,
and whether the truths we hold as truths are true are
issues apart from what strategies scientists use to present
evidence and convince others of its scientific
reasonableness.
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However, wish as we might, such deep rooted and
historically popular issues are not so easily laid to rest.
Some argue that accepting the premise that science has a
rhetorical element presupposes a certain epistemological
bent.

For instance, the logical positivists such as those

of the Vienna Circle, foundationalists who grounded
knowledge claims in observable, empirical hard facts, would
accept no such notion.

Other more "soft" or "fuzzy"

thinkers like Richard Rorty, who would substitute the term
"unforced agreement" for objectivity, readily endorse the
concept of a rhetorical face of science.

James A. Berlin

earlier identified two twentieth century rhetorics with
dichotomous positions on the role of language in reality.
To further complicate the matter, some programs of
rhetorical inquiry make epistemological claims.

Nelson and

Megill argue that the program espoused by the rhetoric of
inquiry is "a conceptually adequate and pragmatically
useful replacement for foundationalism and objectivism"
(Hikins and Zagacki 201).

Simons remarks that the rhetoric

of inquiry "will change the way we think about the way we
think."

And Bazerman's analysis of the epistemological

trends in spectroscopic articles demonstrates how
epistemological stance influences an article's rhetoric.
Hikins and Zagacki offer the finest theory I have
encountered to reconcile the scientists' search for truth
while allowing for their use of rhetoric.

Hikins and
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Zagacki offer their theory as an attenuation of the
rhetoric of inquiry's program.

They object to the rhetoric

of inquiry's subjectivist emphasis, claiming its program is
"grounded on erroneous and inconsistent assumptions" and
objecting that such interpretations "prevent an adequate
account of past progress in the sciences, philosophy, and
the arts"

(201).

Hikins and Zagacki argue that the

rhetoric of inquiry "abandons the distinction between
epistemology and ontology, resulting in untenable
consequences"

(212).

They further criticize the rhetoric of inquiry on
several levels.
notion of the

First, they argue generally against the
"value— laden hypothesis," prevalent in

sociological views of science and philosophies similar to
Kuhn's.

Such views argue that scientists have values,

goals, and preconceptions that necessarily affect their
hypotheses and observations of experimental data and
outcomes.

Kuhn, for instance, argues that there is no

theory—independent way of testing reality.

This view,

argue Hikins and Zagacki, is a non sequitur.

They concede

that scientists, like all other people, have values, goals,
and so on, but this concession "in no way entails that
observation is systematically or necessarily distorted, or
otherwise rendered opaque to understanding.

Indeed, this

conclusion is merely assumed to follow by most who rely on
the argument"

(209).
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Second, Hikins and Zagacki attack a notion central to
the rhetoric of inquiry's program and exemplified by
Rorty's concept of "unforced agreement":

intersubjective

truth, "that audiences decide upon their own standards of
discovery and decision-making, and what counts as 'true'
for such audiences is whatever they agree upon by
consensus....With the dissolution of objectivist ontology
comes the kindred dissolution of any external standards by
which to evaluate...the beliefs of rhetorical communities
as 'false'"

(212-213).

Therefore, they argue, the Flat

Earth Society's beliefs about a truly flat earth or the
community of children's beliefs in Santa Claus are as valid
as any other belief.

Hikins and Zagacki rebut the argument

for intersubjective truth thusly: no matter how many or how
strongly children believe in Santa Claus, he will not
really exist

(213).

Thirdly, Hikins and Zagacki realize that the result of
the program's replacing symbolism for realism and
representationalism leaves it open to the same criticism it
levels against realism and representationalism, because the
symbols it substitutes actually represent real—world
concepts such as "rhetors, audiences, messages, objects of
discourse, and goals of edification"

(217).

They conclude that
So thoroughgoing is the skepticism resulting once
this realization obtains, that [this view]
devolves into a solipsistic conundrum....If we
hold the skeptic to his/her assumptions, no
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audience can ever possibly comprehend the intent
of the expositor's discourse, and no expositor
can ever hope to gauge successfully the
audience's reasons for interpreting his/her
message as it does. Communication appears
hopeless. Obviously, skeptics must be making
some tacit, if not a priori, assumptions about
the rhetorical nature of rhetorical
situations.... There is, in short, no consistent
way for such a position to give an account of
language and communication which does not simply
undermine its own rejection of objectivity.
(218)
Hikins and Zagacki "suggest that the only way to
preserve as meaningful and useful such seminal
communication concepts as audience, speaker, message, and
rhetorical environment is to renounce representationalism
in all its forms," including the above discussed symbolism,
the idea that communication operates through symbols that
distort or even create reality (218).

To do so, one must

reject the assumption "that the objects of reality— thingsin-themselves— are necessarily opaque to human
understanding"

(218).

What they offer as an attenuation to

the rhetoric of inquiry's program they term "rhetorical
perspectivism."
According to this view, conflicting or various
depictions of reality are not so much the product of
subjective distortions as they are the products of the
viewer's perspective on a particular aspect of reality.
For instance, one observer of a high hill may report that
the hillside is covered with deciduous trees while another
may report the hillside is covered with pine trees.

Though
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at first these reports may appear contradictory or even
mutually exclusive, they are both accurate when one
considers perspective:

the two observers are looking at

different sides of the same high hill

(219).

No logical

problems are involved; no epistemic problem exists; and the
disparate reports are reconciled through a process of
communication:

once both campers explain their positions—

that is, allow one another to "stand inside the other's
perspective"— both are enlightened (220).

Thus, though the

view is a realist view, the role of rhetoric remains
central, for in mediating perspectives,

"language does not

stand as a distorting intermediary between rhetor/knower
and the object of discourse/knowledge.

Instead, language

serves as an interface, making possible a linkage between
consciousness and the furnishings of the external world"
(222).

Hikins and Zagacki can thus salvage realism and

objectivism and maintain the centrality of rhetoric in the
doing of science.

Their rhetorical perspectivism meets the

"scientific standards" of elegance and parsimony and seems
a valuable and reasonable mediation of realism and
rhetoric, demonstrating that a rhetoric of science can play
a central role even in realist world-views.

This review of the literature has suggested most
importantly the inter-relationships among the rhetoric of
science and the philosophy and sociology of science, the
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rhetoric of inquiry, and epistemology.

Scientific rhetors

draw upon and are influenced by all these disciplines, for
evident is the importance of identifying relevant
scientific issues and concerns and addressing these
satisfactorily for the audience.

Additionally, many

specific issues and concerns from these disciplines were
identified as factors in the cold fusion controversy,
especially from the philosophy and sociology of science.
For example, the philosophy of science suggests the
importance of Fleischmann and Pons's demonstrating the
relevance of their claims to current lines of thinking and
inquiry; Fleischmann and Pons violated many sociological
norms of scientific behavior.

Chapter three will develop a

working method whereby the rhetorical critic can identify
these relevant issues and concerns that confront scientific
rhetors in their attempts to deal successfully with these
elements in their discourse.

Chapter Three:

Methods of Rhetorical Analysis

Chapter two asserts the central importance of
communication between scientists in their practice of
science.

An examination of scholarship from the

philosophy, rhetoric, and sociology of science reveals the
importance of scientists first identifying relevant issues
from their particular communities and research programs and
then addressing these issues satisfactorily.

Successful

scientific writers may demonstrate how their work fits into
and advances the current program of research; they may
solicit support for their particular disciplinary matrix;
they may attempt to describe a new phenomenon and lay claim
to a particular research avenue;

or they may argue strongly

that one theoretical orientation

is more fruitful than some

other.
The obvious task, then, in order to judge the degree
of the scientific writer's success, must also be to
identify the relevant concerns of the scientific community
and various research programs.

S . Michael Halloran has

more clearly identified this task:
rhetorical critic is to discover

"the job of the

what in the particular

case were the available means of persuasion, and judge
whether the rhetor managed them well or badly"

(70).

In this chapter, I will develop a working theory of
rhetorical analysis by examining a method developed by
83
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Lawrence Prelli in his book, A Rhetoric of Science:
Inventing Scientific Discourse, and by reviewing Halloran's
rhetorical analysis of DNA discourse.

Using Prelli's

method to identify relevant issues and lines of argument
and Halloran's method of what I term "close reading" to
judge how well these issues and arguments are addressed, I
will apply in chapter four this working theory of
rhetorical analysis to the cold fusion controversy.
Because Prelli's is the more formalized of the two methods,
I first discuss his in some detail and then turn to
Halloran's method through an examination of his analysis of
DNA discourse.

Prelli's Special Theory of Rhetorical Invention
Lawrence Prelli asserts that when scientists
communicate with one another,
rhetoric"

(1).

"they make a special kind of

There is more to science than the logical

dimension; he discusses McMullin who argues that the
logicality of science is but one aspect of science.

The

logical positivists of the Vienna Circle erred when they
insisted that science proceeds only on the basis of
formally logical criteria.
criticism from many sources.

Such an insistence elicited
As discussed in chapter two,

for instance, Popper successfully undermined the notions of
induction and verifiability.

Kuhn argued that formally

logical procedures occurred only during what he termed
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periods of "normal science."

Prelli also makes the point

emphasized in chapter two that all the aforementioned
theories of the philosophy, sociology, and history of
science and the rhetorical programs of inquiry, when "taken
collectively, make clear that science has an other-thanformally-logical 'face',"
"interpretive face"

which McMullin has termed the

(Prelli 3).

In sum, this interpretive face is intuitive,
irreducible to explicit criteria, context dependent,
reliant on individual talents, and often controversial
(Prelli 3).

It follows that if science has an

interpretative face, the activity of doing science is
necessarily rhetorical, involving "arguments that are
informal, material, contextual, and controversial"

(Prelli

5) .
Prelli goes on to argue that to study scientific
communication, one must establish a valid and reliable
theory of scientific rhetoric.

A rhetoric of science is

not actually the science, but must indicate the logic that
the science exhibits.

It also is not a philosophy,

history, sociology, or psychology of science, but again
must agree with the tenets of such.

A rhetoric of science

should explain comprehensively the communicative practices
of a science:

the discursive decisions scientists make

when attempting to "render their claims reasonable in the
eyes of scientific audiences"

(Prelli 8), and the way
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scientists decide between competing theories.

Such

scientific decisions are based on "good reason,11 that is,
the "choices will be made with due respect for the values
and knowledge problems shared by that [scientific]
community"

(Prelli 113).

Claims can be considered

reasonable depending on how well they are judged to
"possess qualities of empirical accuracy, consistency,
quantitative precision, or explanatory power."

Claims

which lack these qualities "can be dubbed scientifically
unreasonable"

(Prelli 115).

Scientists, however, while sharing a variety of
values, can still debate reasonably about the relative
importance and applicability of these values in a given
situation.

In such cases, the "logicality of persuasive

success depends on whether those claims can be judged
situationally reasonable"

(Prelli 114).

This view of

scientific rhetoric agrees with traditional definitions of
rhetoric and their concern with persuasion in the given
situation.

Further, such a view

avoids the strains and struggles of accounting
for scientific activity as fundamentally either
rational or irrational, objective or subjective.
It is also consistent with what actually happens
in scientific exchanges. Audiences of scientists
judge scientific claims, not with reference to
the canons of formal logic, but against received
community problems, values, expectations, and
interests. The judgmental standards are located
within situated audiences' frames of reference,
not in logical rules that transcend specific
situations for scientific claiming.
(Prelli 7)
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The goal, then, of a rhetoric of science should be to
reveal "the principles according to which scientific
discourse is created and judged" in order to "reveal
significant aspects of scientific endeavors that might
otherwise be concealed"

(8) .

Prelli has developed such a rhetoric of science.
definition is adapted from Aristotle,

His

"the faculty of

observing in any given case the available means of
persuasion"

(35), and Burke's idea of symbolic language,

that rhetoric is "the suasory use of language as a symbolic
means of inducing cooperative acts and attitudes in
symbolizing [human] beings " (13—14).
Prelli has identified the methods by which scientists
use rhetorical invention as a means of constructing
successful scientific rhetoric.

As established earlier,

these methods are also useful for the analysis of
scientific rhetoric.

Prelli has developed a matrix of

stasis procedures and distinguished several scientific
rhetorical topoi appropriate to scientific discourse.

Both

of these aspects of rhetorical invention promise to be
useful tools for a case study of cold fusion.

Rhetorical Stases
Prelli's matrix of the rhetorical stases— or issues—
of scientific discourse identify particular points of
contention in discourse.

Prelli observes that "points at

88

issue in science always concern one or more of problems
about existence, meaning, value, and. action"

(147).

These

four points of contention he terms superior stases, and
they
identify arguable points about the four grand
functions of doing science: adducing evidence,
interpreting constructs and information,
evaluating the scientific significance of matters
discussed, and applying scientific methods.
Discussants must agree on such matters or
scientific activity cannot expand comprehension
of natural order. (Prelli 145)
Included under each of these superior stases are
subordinate issues that must be reconciled;
them subordinate stases.

Prelli labels

The sixteen stases and their

concerns are shown below in figure 1.
For a scientific rhetor's discourse to seem
scientifically reasonable, he or she must address one or
more of the issues involved in the superior stases;

the

audience may already be concerned with the issues, or the
rhetor may raise them. Sometimes a single piece of
discourse may address all four superior stases.

For

instance, scientists may question whether enough evidence
exists to present a definite judgment on some new
phenomenon.

Some may argue that the evidence is an

instrumental artifact or is inconclusive (evidential) .
Others may contend that the models used for explaining the
phenomenon are more important than the certainty of the
evidence (interpretative) .

Yet others may argue that the

evidence is insufficiently scientifically valuable to
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pursue

(evaluative); and someone else may contend that no

more evidence is needed but a new method of collecting
evidence is (methodological) (Prelli 147) .
SUPERIOR STASES
SUBORDINATE
STASES

EVIDENTIAL

INTERPRETATIVE

EVALUATIVE

Conjectural

Is there
scientific
evidence
for claim
x?

Is there a
scientifically
meaningful
construct for
interpreting
evidence?

Is claim x
Is procedure x
scientifically a viable
significant?
scientific
procedure in
this case?

Definitional

What does
the
evidence
mean?

What does
construct y
mean?

What does
value z mean?

What does it
mean to apply
procedure x
correctly?

Qualitative

Which
empirical
judgements
are
warranted
by
available
evidence?

Which
interpretive
applications
of construct y
are more
meaningful?

Which claims
are more
significant,
given value z?

Which
investigations
exemplify
appropriate
applications
of procedure
x?

Translative

Which
evidence
more
reliably
grounds
claims
about what
does and
does not
exist?

Figure 1.

Which
scientific
constructs are
more
meaningful?

Which
scientific
values are
more
significant?

METHODOLOGICAL

Which
procedures
more usefully
guide
scientific
actions?

Rhetorical Stasis Procedures of Scientific
Discourse
(Prelli 146)

Also, a paper may address all four subordinate stases
within a superior framework.

For instance, in a paper

announcing a discovery, the scientist might address the
evidential stasis to establish that the new phenomenon does
indeed exist.

Discourse addressed at establishing the

90

reliability of the evidence or that the evidence is not an
instrumental artifact would involve the evidential/
conjectural stasis; addressing questions about the meaning
of the evidence or fitting it into existing taxonomies
involves the evidential/definitional stasis.

Demonstrating

that the evidence proves a conclusion instead of merely
suggesting probability addresses the evidential/conjectural
stasis, while determining which claims about reality seem
the most likely based on the evidence addresses the
evidential/definitional.
On the other hand, in dealing with a new phenomenon,
writers might place their discourse within the
interpretative framework, determining which scientific
models are most useful for illuminating the evidence.
Therefore, put into the situation of writing about new
phenomenon, the writer is faced with a choice:

does enough

evidence exist to render a definite judgment that will seem
scientifically reasonable?

Or should one simply suggest a

construct for interpreting the new evidence?

Whatever the

situation, however, the important characteristic of all the
above situations, for both the scientific writer and the
rhetorical critic, is the abundance of choice.
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter,
Prelli offers his stasis procedures primarily as a method
for creating scientific discourse but also recognizes its
value as a means of analysis.

By making scientists and
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rhetorical critics more formally aware of this already
informally recognized procedure, perhaps then, as Nelson
and Megill suggest, the "sciences would become more
comprehensible to themselves and others"

(Rhetoric 7).

Rhetorical Topoi
In addition to his matrix of stasis procedures, Prelli
has also identified several rhetorical topoi, or lines of
argument, which one would reasonably anticipate a
scientific audience to raise in a given situation.

Prelli

contends
(1) that there are in fact identifiable lines of
thought that are used again and again in the
sciences; (2) that these lines of thought
legitimize scientific observations and claims
because they derive from what is accepted and
valued in scientific communities; and (3) that if
we want to see what the logical formulas and
characteristics of scientific discourse are, we
must grant that these topoi identify structures
of thought that scientists (and often others)
find situationally reasonable.
These themes
constitute a stable, ever-present collection of
discussable options....Knowing what these options
are is helpful to any scientist deciding what to
say and how to say it to his or her colleagues.
Knowing them is also useful in critique of
scientific rhetoric because the array of standard
topoi will remind observers of what could have
been said about a scientific subject. With
knowledge of these options a creator or critic of
scientific rhetoric is able to estimate the
relative usefulness or nonusefulness of themes in
specific rhetorical situations.
Knowledge of
legitimated themes is also knowledge of what
topoi will not count as reasonable, scientific
thought; for example, the toposof "inspiration"
is not in the array of topoi authorized by
scientific communities.
(Prelli 216-217)
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A method of rhetorical topoi, then, would yield a heuristic
which one could follow to generate ideas about topics that
may be raised by a particular audience and that would help
persuade that audience.

Such a method would generate

categories, questions, or relationships between ideas
perhaps not readily evident to the rhetor otherwise.
Topoi differ from stases in that stases are issues of
dispute and questions of relevance, whiletopoi are lines of
argument which one may use to address the issues.

For

example, the stasis. or issue, may be whether or not an
experimental result was actually observed; the rhetor may
include the topos of significant anomaly to help convince
others of the importance of the finding.

In practice, a

rhetor (or rhetorical analyst) could identify the issues in
discourse, and then consider which of the several lines of
argument could be used to address the issue.
Considering the goal of science— to explain, predict,
and control natural phenomena— Prelli has identified for
scientific discourse four typical categories of topoi and
the line of argument relevant to each that scientists may
include to enhance the persuasiveness of their discourse:
problem-solution topoi. lines of argument that address
whether research should or should not be accepted because
it will or will not further the problem solving concerns of
the scientific community;

evaluative topoi. in which the

values of accuracy, simplicity, scope, and consistency are
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argued;

exemplary topoi, which deal with analogies,

metaphors, and examples, and topoi of ethos, which address
possible conflicts between the rhetor's interests and the
normative goals of science (125-126).
Figure two shows Prelli's four categories of topoi and
lists beneath each the relevant lines of argument that he
has identified.

PROBLEMSOLUTION

EVALUATIVE

EXEMPLARY

ETHOS

Experimental
competence

Accuracy

Example

Communality

Observational
competence

Internal .
consistency

Illustration

Disinterestedness

Experimental
replication

External
consistency

Analogy

Individuality

Experimental
originality

Scope

Metaphor

Particularity

Predictive
power

Simplicity

Skepticism

Taxonomic power

Elegance

Universality

Quant itat ive
precision

Fruitfulness

Empirical
adequacy
Significant
anomaly
Anomaly—
solution

Figure 2.

Prelli's Categories of Rhetorical Topoi

Among the problem-solution topoi, the most relevant to
the analysis of cold fusion include the topos of
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experimental competence, which addresses the competence of
the experimenters as well as whether the observation
resulted from a scientifically conducted experiment;
experimental replication, which concerns whether the
results can be duplicated;

and external consistency, which

asks if the observation or theory corresponds with accepted
knowledge.

The relevant evaluative topos is external

consistency, the argument that findings should fit with
accepted knowledge. Also important to the cold fusion
controversy are the topoi that deal with the scientist's
ethos.

Communality maintains the importance of

intellectual participation with one's scientific community
and also forbids association with the lay community;
disinterestedness requires that the scientist emotionally
distance him or herself from the results, findings, or
observations;

and universality concerns whether the

scientist conducted him or herself according to widely
accepted scientific standards.

Prelli's Analysis of Watson and Crick
Prelli applies his special theory of rhetorical
invention/analysis to several episodes of communication,
including Watson and Crick's article, "A Structure for
Deoxyribose Nucleic Acid"

in which they communicate their

discovery of the DNA double helix.

Since both Prelli and

Halloran analyze this article, the opportunity exists to
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examine the application of their methods and evaluate their
usefulness as analytical tools concerning scientific
rhetoric.
Prelli contends that the success of the Watson-Crick
article resulted from "the wisdom with which the authors
chose their points to address and the persuasiveness and
logical relevance of the topoi from which they drew
argument"

(249).

They did what scientists must do when

attempting to persuade their peers:

chose a rhetorical

purpose aimed at addressing a particular issue, in this
case the interpretive issue, and engaged, in order, the
relevant subordinate stases—

conjectural, definitional,

and qualitative— that otherwise could have prevented the
audience's acceptance of the paper's claims.
Watson and Crick framed the issue concerning the
structure of the DNA molecule as an interpretive stasis,
one involving "ambiguities in the meanings of theoretical
constructs used to account for data"

(Prelli 151).

The

community of molecular biologists had at their disposal
much empirical data and accepted theory concerning
molecular behavior, but had "difficulty deciding what
theoretical constructs or models accommodate" the data and
theory (Prelli 151).
Having framed the rhetorical situation in the
interpretative stasis, Watson and Crick then proceed,
Prelli discovers, to address the subordinate stases of
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conjectural, definitional, and qualitative, in that order.
Watson and Crick first demonstrate that no scientifically
meaningful construct existed to interpret the available
evidence, thereby addressing the conjectural stasis of the
interpretive framework-

They next offer their own model,

addressing the interpretive/definitional issue by
"answering the central question:
molecular structure of DNA?"

What is the model for the

(Prelli 24 0).

Finally, Watson

and Crick address the interpretative/gualitative issue by
answering the question, Which interpretive applications of
the double-helix model are more meaningful?

In addressing

this final issue, they demonstrated their model's
reasonableness by evoking the topoi of empirical adequacy
and explanatory power (Prelli 243).
Prelli concludes his analysis by making the following
observations about scientific rhetoric:

1) scientists,

like other rhetors, choose from "among alternative ways" of
expressing themselves; 2) their choices are influenced by
ideals of reasonableness on the part of their specific
scientific audience; 3) "a finite set of themes, values,
and criteria constrains what will be necessary and
appropriate to say"; 4) such constraints "are neither
irrational nor formally logical" but nonetheless provide
standards by which scientific discourse is judged; and 5)
these constraints are modifications of "principles of

97

general rhetorical theory concerning ends, points at issue,
and topoi" (256-257).

Halloran's Method of Close Reading
S . Michael Halloran also examines the rhetoric of the
Watson—Crick paper in "The Birth of Molecular Biology:

An

Essay in the Rhetorical Criticism of Scientific Discourse."
Though his method of analysis is less formalized than
Prelli's, he identifies the topos of elegance and addresses
the ethos of Watson and Crick, as might one using Prelli's
method.

However, his method of what I term "close reading"

focuses mainly on word choice and tone and the way these
features create the ethos which Halloran claims is central
to the rhetorical success of the Watson/Crick article.
Halloran contends that Watson and Crick establish for
themselves a particular ethos; they "offered a model of the
scientist, of how he ought to hold ideas and present them
to his peers"

(78), that is, "confident, personal,

rhetorically adept"

(77).

[and]

The success of their paper,

claims Halloran, is a result of this ethos that they
establish for themselves.

Halloran relies upon knowledge

of the rhetorical situation and begins his criticism with a
brief summary of the competition between Pauling, Wilkins,
Franklin, and Watson and Crick surrounding DNA research,
indicating that no one anticipated the implications of
knowing the DNA structure.

Halloran argues that the
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Watson—Crick ethos is a result of this competitiveness and
the significance of the structural model in "the
possibility of mastering and ultimately manipulating the
process" of genetic replication (71).
Early in his analysis, Halloran identifies Watson and
Crick's use of topoi, specifically that of scientific
elegance (as Watson observed, "a structure this pretty [the
DNA double-helix] just had to exist") and explanatory
power.

(These observations are similar to those which

Prelli might make and endorse.)

Both topoi are represented

implicitly, however, with no explicit, lengthy discussion
or explanation.
According to Halloran, these topoi constitute the
first two of three substantial arguments which Watson and
Crick advance. The third argument is a negative one:

"the

proposed model is not inconsistent with any available
experimental data"

(Halloran 74). Though this argument is

advanced explicitly, unlike the first two, Halloran
emphasizes "how carefully qualified the statement is" (74).
He suggests that the paper is thus argumentatively
understated, "and the rhetorical effect is to communicate a
sense of supreme confidence"

(74).

The paper's initial

claims to "considerable biological interest" are advanced
by "arguments [that is, topoi1...assumed to be so
persuasive that they need no bolstering or emphasis"

(74).

Watson and Crick are able to project, then, an ethos of
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supreme confidence.

Thus, Halloran identifies Watson and

Crick's use of the topoi of elegance and explanatory power,
as one might by using Prelli's method, but Halloran's
"close reading" moves him beyond identifying the relevant
line of argument to revealing how the argument was
implemented effectively.
Halloran next looks closely at the "genteel tone" of
the Watson-Crick paper, citing from the introduction,

"We

wish to suggest a structure for the salt o f ...DNA....This
structure has novel features which are of considerable
biological interest"

(Halloran 74) .

He identifies the

"delicate fashion" in which Watson and Crick dismiss a
rival model suggested by Pauling and Corey:

"In our

opinion, this structure is unsatisfactory for two reasons:
(1)

We believe that the material which gives the x—ray

diagrams is the salt, not the free acid.

Without the

acidic hydrogen atoms it is not clear what forces would
hold the structure together....(2) Some of the van der
Waals distances appear to be too small"

(Halloran 74).

Halloran uses knowledge of the rhetorical situation in
explaining the tone of the Pauling-Corey rejection,
recalling Watson's account of how he and Crick "were
astonished and jubilant to find the great Pauling guilty of
what they regarded as a gross error"

(Halloran 74).

If

this account is accurate, Halloran asserts, then the paper
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"reflects a rhetorical persona" written "with a bit of
intentional, tongue-in-cheek irony"

(74).

Halloran attends to the one—sentence conclusion of the
Watson-Crick paper,

"It has not escaped our notice that the

specific pairing we have postulated immediately suggests a
possible copying mechanism for the genetic material."

He

remarks that, "One can almost feel the elbow in one's
ribs," and that Watson and Crick's "genteel style becomes a
transparent burlesque"

(74).

Again, Halloran asserts that

this tone creates the persona, or ethos, of Watson and
Crick that is central to the paper's success.

A Working Model of Rhetorical Analysis
Clearly, the strength of Prelli's theory of rhetorical
invention and analysis lies in identifying for a given
situation the relevant stases and topoi that a scientist
must address to render his or her discourse scientifically
reasonable in the eyes of the audience.

The strength of

Halloran's model of close textual reading lies in revealing
the subtleties of language and argument, identifying such
textual features as tone, understatement, and word choice,
which Prelli's method is unable to accommodate.

Combining

the strengths of both Prelli's special theory and
Halloran's model, one can conceive of a powerful tool for
rhetorical analysis.

The two-fold task of the rhetorical

critic in Halloran's definition,

"to discover what in the
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particular case were the available means of persuasion, and
judge whether the rhetor managed them well or badly"

(70)

would seem well—served by this combination.
Of further importance is the fact that Prelli did not
in the course of his analysis reveal Watson and Crick's
evocation of the topoi of elegance and explanatory power,
their use being critical to Halloran's analysis.

A

possible interpretation of Halloran's identifying those
lines of argument while Prelli did not is that Halloran's
reliance on language and the understatement of argument led
him to notice the existence, and importance, of those
topoi.

Prelli's analysis focused more on the structure of

the article, the important concern for him being the
identification of superior and subordinate stases.

It may

be that combining the methods would yield more than the sum
of their parts, the two methods complementarily revealing
features, then, which the other may not detect.
Considering the above, the procedure used in the next
chapter applies Prelli's method, identify all possible,
relevant issues and lines of argument that the writers
could have drawn upon; next, identifies the issues and
arguments employed; and then, following Halloran's model,
determines the manner in which these are addressed and the
degree of success in terms of rendering the discussion
scientifically reasonable to the audience.

Chapter Four:

The Rhetoric of Cold Fusion

Prelli's model of rhetorical invention, with its
theories of stases(issues) and topoi

(lines of argument),

combined with Halloran's method of close reading offer a
powerful method for rhetorical analysis.

Having described

this method, I will now apply it to analyze particular
pieces of discourse in the cold fusion controversy.

My

objective will be to discover how the cold fusion
controversy may be considered rhetorical in nature and how
understanding the rhetoric involved can increase our
understanding of the controversy in particular, as well as
how science operates in general.

Selection of Texts
Although both Fleischmann and Pons and Jones initially
agreed to submit papers simultaneously to Nature on March
24, 1989, Fleischmann and Pons sent a brief paper to the
Journal of Electroanalytical Chemistry on March 11.
Following the University of Utah press conference on March
23, Jones immediately sent his own paper to Nature.
Fleischmann and Pons submitted another brief paper to
Nature the next day, March 24, but subsequently withdrew
that paper.

Fleischmann and Pons's March 11 paper then

appeared in the April issue of the Journal of
Electroanalytical Chemistry;

Jones's paper appeared that
102
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same month in the April 27, 1989, issue of Nature.

A

flurry of discursive activity followed these events, and my
rhetorical analysis will focus on representative samples.
I will examine Fleischmann and Pons's first published
article about their cold fusion discovery;

Steven Jones's

initial article about his own cold fusion discovery;
several samples of scientific correspondence both in
support of and critical of the Fleischmann and Pons claim;
an editorial by Nature editor John Maddox;

and finally one

of the final published communications by Fleischmann and
Pons about their cold fusion claims.

These items come

primarily from one source, the scientific journal Nature,
for several reasons.
First, Nature was the choice of both Fleischmann and
Pons and Steven Jones for their initial publications
(although Fleischmann and Pons subsequently submitted their
article elsewhere and had another version rejected by
Nature) .

Secondly, because of its content of timely

scientific discoveries and discussions and its weekly
publication schedule, Nature became a forum for the cold
fusion controversy; scientists could publish and read
therein the latest breaking news about cold fusion.
Finally, Nature evolved into an intriguing and varied
forum, in that alongside original research articles, one
could find letters and editorials,

all of which could have
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been read by scientists actually engaged in cold fusion
research.
I depart from this forum on two instances, however, to
include significant pieces of discourse.

I include

Fleischmann and Pons's article that appeared in the Journal
of Electroanalytical Chemistry because it was the
scientists'

first published account of their cold fusion

experiments, and it
discourse.

precipitated much of the cold fusion

I also include one of their final articles,

published in summer 1990 in the Journal of Fusion
Technology, to examine the responses of Fleischmann and
Pons to representative criticisms and also because the
article addresses criticisms raised at one of the several
conferences at which cold fusion was discussed to examine
in what ways this criticism is addressed through written
discouse.
While these texts are but a small sampling of the
numerous papers, letters, editorials, and news items
concerning cold fusion, those texts I have selected fairly
represent the kinds of issues and arguments raised
throughout the controversy and convey a valid sense of the
debate.

Significant media of cold fusion debate not

addressed closely here

(see above, however)

are the

numerous conferences and meetings held by chemists and
physicists alike, many of which were identified in chapter
one's timeline.

Many conclusions about cold fusion claims
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were apparently reached at these gatherings, but the
unavailability of accurate transcriptions precluded my
examining these media in a rhetorical analysis.

The Original Research
Fleischmann and Pons's Article
Fleischmann and Pons's first cold fusion publication,
"Electrochemically induced nuclear fusion of deuterium,"
appeared in the April 1989 issue of the Journal of
Electroanalytical Chemistry.

The article was not

published, however, as a typical research paper;

their

eight-page work appeared as a "Preliminary note," an
atypical entry into this journal, which usually publishes
comprehensive research papers.

As a preliminary note, the

article failed to describe the experiment in sufficient
detail to allow replication to confirm its results and
contained no mention of the control experiments that are
typical of this type of announcement.

Journal editor

Ronald Fawcett nevertheless named the paper "a very
significant piece of science... definitely worth publishing
as a preliminary communication"

(Dagani 14).

As shown in chapter one's timeline, Pons and
Fleischmann had submitted a similar paper to Nature that
was rejected.

The paper submitted to Nature was an even

shorter version than that published by the Journal of
Electroanalytical Chemistry (Dagani 14; Maddox,

"Cold

Fusion" 604).

Pons and Fleischmann declined requests by

Nature to expand the data in their paper, taking, as Nature
editor John Maddox described it, "the view that they could
not at the same time satisfy the referees and get on with
other urgent work"

("Cold Fusion" 604).

The publication of

the Fleischmann and Pons article as a note does not suggest
that Fleischmann and Pons were uncertain of their claim;
the term "Preliminary" does not in this case indicate
"tentative" or "probing,"
publication.

but indicates an initial, first

Such a circumstance suggests that Fleischmann

and Pons may have been seeking to be first with news of
cold fusion, claiming the phenomenon as their own.

Nature

editor John Maddox raises this point in his criticisms of
cold fusion, examined in detail later.

Whatever their

motivation, however, it is the certainty with which
Fleischmann and Pons assert their claim that diminished the
success of their article.

The authors chose an

unsuccessful rhetorical framework in which to announce
their discovery and, in so doing, ignored many possible
lines of argument— rhetorical topoi— against the
reasonableness of their claims.
In terms of issues, Fleischmann and Pons situate their
research firmly in the evidential framework, which concerns
questions about the existence of phenomenon.

All four

subordinate stases, or issues— conjectural, definitional,
qualitative, and translative— may be discovered in their
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article.

Fleischmann and Pons establish the overall

rhetorical impetus of their article as
evidential/conjectural, "Is there evidence for claim X?" at
the conclusion of their brief "Introduction" with the
question:

"In view of the very high compression and

mobility" of deuterium in the palladium molecular lattice
work,

"would nuclear fusion...be feasible under these

conditions?" which asks if scientific evidence exists for
cold fusion. This research question, however,

is similar to

one that might easily begin a discussion that situates
itself in the interpretative/conjectural stases and would
in effect ask if any existing scientific construct,
specifically nuclear fusion, could explain the experimental
data that followed in the article.
approach,

This interpretative

I argue later, might have been more rhetorically

successful, but Fleischmann and Pons focus instead on the
evidential.
The evidential framework is an unsuccessful one for
Fleischmann and Pons because even though they fail to find
conclusive scientific evidence, they remain convinced that
they have indeed discovered cold nuclear fusion.

By not

finding evidence of the fusion products that one would
expect to find based on accepted, current knowledge,
however, Fleischmann and Pons are then forced to posit "an
hitherto unknown nuclear process or processes," and fail to
address successfully in their experimental framework the
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definitional stasis, "What does the evidence mean?" and the
qualitative, "Which empirical judgments are warranted by
the available evidence?"
The eight-page article is divided into the four
sections typical of scientific papers: Introduction,
Experimental, Results, and Discussion.

As cited in chapter

two, Medawar argues that this arrangement reinforces the
notion of the scientists who posit a hypothesis— "would
nuclear fusion...be feasible under these conditions?"— and
then gather objective evidence until a conclusion is
reached.

This arrangement conforms with the

evidential/conjectural framework, again which asks "Is
there scientific evidence for claim X?"

In such a

framework, the scientists would then proceed, after having
asked the research question, to set up experiments and
gather evidence, which Fleischmann and Pons do.
In the next section of the article,

"Experimental,"

Fleischmann and Pons fail to describe fully either their
apparatus or its functions in order to facilitate
replication by other scientists.

They write only one

sentence to describe the electrochemical cells containing
the palladium electrodes submerged in the deuterium bath,
focusing instead on how their experimental measurements of
expected fusion rates were obtained.
experiments.

They describe four

Given below are the first sentences from each

of the four sections in "Experimental" that describe those
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four experiments.

Where one would expect to find

descriptions of experimental apparatus used to generate the
phenomenon, one finds instead statements about how
measurements were made, demonstrating Fleischmann and
Pons's concern with the evidential;
(1) Calorimetric measurements of heat balances
at low current densities.. .were made using....
(2) Calorimetric measurements of heat balances
at higher current densities were carried out
u s i n g ....
(3)
The spectrum of y-rays emitted from the
water b a t h . ..was determined using....
(4)
The rate of generation/accumulation of
tritium was measured using....
By not describing fully their experimental apparatus,
Fleischmann and Pons fail to address successfully the
problem—solution topos of experimental replication, in
which "scientific rhetors are expected to provide
sufficiently detailed explanations of methods and
procedures so that the experiment can be replicated
accurately"

{Prelli 189).

The products of nuclear fusion are well established in
the scientific community:

tritium,

3, neutrons, and (heat) energy.

light hydrogen, helium

Note that 2 of the 4

experiments involved measured excess heat.
involved analysis of gamma—ray spectra

Experiment

(3)

(gamma—rays are

produced when the neutron products of fusion are captured
by hydrogen ions in the waterbath), and experiment
measured tritium production.

(4)

Of the five products of

nuclear fusion, Fleischmann and Pons describe measurements
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for only threehelium.

Noticeably missing is a measurement for

Fleischmann and Pons promise at the end of the

Experimental section that results "for the mass
spectroscopy of the evolved gases

[the search for

He]...will be given elsewhere," and this sentence is
followed by a reference.

The "elsewhere" refers to as yet

(at the time) unsubmitted material by Fleischmann and Pons.
Were one to evoke the topos of scientific corroboration,
Fleischmann and Pons could be criticized for offering
evidence that is yet to be established as accepted
knowledge.
By situating their discourse in the
evidential/conjectural framework and describing
measurements for only 3 of the 5 products of fusion, one
would expect, to assure rhetorical success, to see strong
experimental evidence of those three measured products:
heat, tritium, and neutrons.

However, Fleischmann and Pons

succeed in finding convincing evidence for only one fusion
product.
Several features of the "Results" section are
rhetorically interesting.

First in this section,

Fleischmann and Pons relate the results of their
calorimetric measurements.

In this section are two tables

depicting excess enthalpy (heat) results based on current
density and electrode size (and shape).

In one experiment

that ran in excess of 120 hours, a huge amount of heat was

Ill

liberated.

Fleischmann and Pons, in this "Results"

section, make an observation that would seem better suited
for the "Discussion" section; they declare that "it is
inconceivable that this [heat release] could be due to
anything but nuclear processes."

It is clear from this

remark that Fleischmann and Pons's foremost concern is
establishing evidence that fusion is feasible.
In the last paragraph detailing the calorimetric
results, the final, three-line sentence is bold-faced.
Just prior to this sentence, they had raised the
possibility that introducing tritium into the bath mixture
on the reactant side of the chemical equation might yield
even greater amounts of excess heat.

As a warning, the

bold-faced sentence reports that "even using D20
[deuterium] alone, a substantial portion of the cathode
fused (melting point 1554°

C) , part of it vapourised,

and the cell and contents and a part of the fume cupboard
housing the experiment were destroyed."

The bold-faced

text— the only to appear in the article— serves not only as
a prudent, well-intentioned warning, but also calls
attention to a dramatic demonstration of the amount of
excess heat reported by Fleischmann and Pons.

They thus

establish that at least one fusion product, heat, is
undoubtedly produced.
The results of experiment (3) deal with the gamma—ray
spectra obtained near the waterbath that held the
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electrolytic cells.

When the neutrons that are produced by

fusion are captured by hydrogen ions in the deuterium bath,
gamma—rays are emitted.

Fleischmann and Pons report that

"this spectrum confirms that 2.45 MeV neutrons are indeed
generated in the electrodes."

The value of 2.45

micro/electron volts is the characteristic energy signature
of an electron emerging from a fusion reaction.

The

discussion is accompanied by a figure depicting the
spectrum signal-line, showing a peak at around 2.25 MeV
(this spectrum figure will be criticized by Petrasso, et
al, examined below).

However, the results of the spectra

analysis show that "the intensities of the spectra are
weak," meaning that the neutron production detected by
Fleischmann and Pons is much lower than would be expected
were nuclear.fusion actually taking place.
The results of experiment

(4) also note this low

neutron flux; consistent with this low neutron production
is the low accumulation in the electrolyte of the fusion
product tritium.

Spectra analysis indicated that tritium

was indeed being produced.

However, these low rates of

production present a problem for Fleischmann and Pons, who
confront this problem in the final paragraph of the results
of experiment

(4).

Already established are the low neutron

flux and, in agreement with this low flux, the low
accumulation of tritium.

"On the other hand, the data on

enthalpy [heat] generation would require" neutron and
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tritium production in much greater amounts.

In other

words, to account for the excessive amounts of heat
generation, one would have to conclude that the fusion
reactions are occurring at rates much greater than either
the evidence for neutron or tritium production indicates.
At this point, Fleischmann and Pons have reached a
rhetorical impasse.

Having couched their article strictly

toward the evidential issue, they are confronted with the
problem of maintaining their claim of cold fusion while
reasonably accounting for these low neutron and tritium
rates.

The products of fusion— cold or hot— are well

established.

Since no known scientific construct can

explain their data, they are forced into one conclusion:
"It is evident that [known fusion] reactions... are only a
small part of the overall reaction scheme and that other
nuclear processes must be involved."
In the Discussion section of their article,
Fleischmann and Pons address the evidential/definitional:
"What does the evidence mean?"

A close look at the

language in the article shows that even though their
evidence does not indicate fusion, Fleischmann and Pons
leave no doubt as to what the evidence does indicate:

"it

is inconceivable that this [heat] is due to anything but
nuclear processes," so "it is evident... that other nuclear
processes must be involved," and finally that "the bulk of
the energy release is due to an hitherto unknown nuclear
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process or processes."

In other words, Fleischmann and

Pons are certain that room-temperature nuclear fusion is
occurring, but in order to account for the low neutron and
tritium production, they must claim further a nuclear
fusion of an unconventional process.

A claim of cold

fusion is remarkable enough, but the Fleischmann and Pons
claim is made even more extraordinary by their claiming an
altogether new type of fusion reaction that yields fewer
neutrons and less tritium than conventional physics allowed
for. Rhetorically, then, their article fails because they
have followed a framework that does not allow them to
reasonably conclude that they have found evidence for what
they claim to have observed.
Fleischmann and Pons introduce the evidentia1/
qualitative issue, which asks if the evidence proves a
conclusion or merely suggests areas for further study, when
they suggest further study:

"evidently, it is necessary to

reconsider the quantum mechanics of electrons and deuterons
in such host lattices [palladium]."

However, Fleischmann

and Pons suggest such research not because they feel their
findings are inconclusive and that further research might
suggest a means whereby their conclusion may find a fit
with explanatory frameworks.

They are actually suggesting

further research so that explanatory frameworks may fit
with their conclusions. As for evidential/qualitative
concerns, Fleischmann and Pons have at best tentative
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evidence for a new type of nuclear fusion, and one could
argue strongly that the evidence is not conclusive but at
best may suggest probability.

Again, their language, given

above, suggests they feel otherwise.
The evidential/translative issue, which asks which
evidence more reliably grounds claims about what does and
does not exist, is raised implicitly by Fleischmann and
Pons when they base their claim on the excess heat
generation.

For them, "it is inconceivable that this

[excess heat] could be due to anything but nuclear
processes."

Obviously, they consider the evidence of heat

the most important indicator, with neutron flux, gamma-ray
production, and tritium generation considered subordinate
proofs.

Recall that helium measurements were not given in

the article at all.

This reliance on excess heat as their

primary evidence left Fleischmann and Pons open to much
criticism on those grounds.

Also, the

evi dent ia1/1rans1at ive reliance on heat evidence plays a
central role in other aspects of the cold fusion
controversy and will be raised later in the analysis of
Steven Jones' article.
Halloran has stated that "the job of the rhetorical
critic is to discover what in the particular case were the
available means of persuasion, and judge whether the rhetor
managed them well or badly"

(70).

As demonstrated, the

evidential framework was rhetorically unsuccessful for
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Fleischmann and Pons because inconclusive evidence prevents
them from reasonably asserting the claim of cold fusion.
However, as suggested earlier, another framework, the
interpretative, might have promised more success, allowed
Fleischmann and Pons to retain much of the information in
their original article,

and would have maintained their

claim to the cold fusion discovery.
Fleischmann and Pons's question at the end of their
"Introduction” asked, in effect,

"Under these conditions,

would cold nuclear fusion be feasible?"

In order to

reasonably answer that question, one would duplicate the
conditions

(compressed deuterium in a palladium molecular

lattice-work) and evaluate the evidence.

In the case of

fusion, the products, or evidence, of fusion are well
known.

Fleischmann and Pons did indeed write their article

along such lines.

But although the evidence was not

conclusive, they remained convinced that the answer to
their question was "Yes, cold nuclear fusion is feasible—
but of a 'hitherto unknown' kind."

The question

Fleischmann and Pons should have asked, however, is t h i s :
"Could cold nuclear fusion be a possible explanation of
what happens under these conditions?"

This question then

moves the framework out of the evidential and into the
interpretative: "Is there a scientifically meaningful
construct for interpreting evidence?"

Fleischmann and Pons

could then have proceeded to present their evidence of
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excess heat, low neutron flux, and low tritium generation
as evidence that something unknown is happening that cannot
be explained by existing scientific constructs regarding
nuclear fusion.

Fleischmann and Pons could then have

offered that perhaps some unknown cold fusion reaction is
taking place.
The difference between the two stances, though subtle,
are rhetorically powerful.

In their article, Fleischmann

and Pons focus on their evidence as convincing proof of an
unknown nuclear process, their paraphrased point claiming
"We have conclusive evidence of an unknown nuclear
process."

More rhetorical success might have been theirs

had they done something similar to what Watson and Crick
did: "We would like to suggest the possibility that cold
nuclear fusion may be an explanation of the excess heat
phenomenon...."
confrontation:

The original, evidential stance invites
Is the evidence conclusive?

evidence really mean?
likely?

What does the

Are other explanations just as

Could chemical processes explain the phenomenon?

One could also argue that the Fleischmann and Pons
conclusion violates Ockham's razor, the philosophical
principle that states that when two or more explanations
are possible, the simplest is the most desirable.

The most

simple explanation of Fleischmann and Pons's results is
that the heat is due to some chemical, and some known,
reaction, and not to an unknown nuclear reaction.
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A letter of July 1989 to Nature by Bridge et al .,
"Cold fusion ideas," suggests just that idea.

"In the

excitement" about cold fusion, they fear that "more
conventional explanations from cognate fields" may be
ignored.

This line of argument is similar to the topos of

simplicity, which holds that the most parsimonious
interpretations are the most desirable.

Again, the

principle of Ockham's razor seems best to explain this line
of argument.
On the other hand, by asking the interpretative
question,

"Could cold nuclear fusion be an explanation?"

Fleischmann and Pons would seem both more scientifically
reasonable, that is, asking if unexpected evidence could be
explained by a particular construct, and would also elicit
less of a confrontational reaction and more of a
cooperative action.

Having been given the evidence and

asked the question, the scientific community could then
join in with Fleischmann and Pons to determine conclusively
if in fact nuclear fusion were taking place.
Fleischmann and Pons seemingly invoke this spirit of
cooperation in the opening sentence to their Discussion
section as they write, "We realize that the results
reported here raise more questions than they provide
answers, and that much further work is required on this
topic."

This first sentence is somewhat ironic in that

Fleischmann and Pons could not have imagined just how many
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questions and what sorts— concerning not only their data
and conclusions but also their methods and status as
credible scientists— would be raised by both the lay and
scientific community.

In many cases, however, an important

job of the scientist is simply to raise appropriate
questions or suggest fruitful avenues of research.
Lakatos' philosophy of science,

In

such activity may be

essential for the success of a research program.

In this

case, however, it seems unlikely that Fleischmann and
Pons's intent, even though their article did result in a
flurry of cold fusion experimentation, was to indicate
important avenues for further study.

In fact, Fleischmann

and Pons were widely criticized for the secrecy surrounding
their experiments, their data, and their apparatus,

as

will be discussed later in the analysis of John Maddox's
Nature editorial.

Note, too, that in the interpretative

framework Fleischmann and Pons could have related their
experimental findings essentially as in the original
article and could have been given credit for the discovery
as well, had further evidence accumulated.

The Steven Jones Article
Steven Jones of Brigham Young University is the other
primary researcher in the cold fusion controversy.

His

article appeared the same month as the initial Fleischmann
and Pons article in the April 27 issue of Nature, a little
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more than a month after the University of Utah press
conference.

In his "Observation of cold nuclear fusion in

condensed matter, " Jones also situates his discourse in the
evidential framework;

accordingly, to be successful at

convincing as to the reasonableness of his claims, he must
provide scientifically reasonable empirical evidence and
draw reasonable conclusions.

In doing so, Jones addresses

the subordinate issues of conjectural and qualitative.
Jones addresses the conjectural issue by offering
neutron production as his sole source of direct evidence.
No mention is made of any observations of excess heat
crucial to the Fleischmann and Pons claim, and no
measurements were made for helium and tritium.

Helium and

excess heat are discussed, however, but only in terms of
"indirect evidence."
Jones describes that he arrived at his particular
formula for making cold fusion from observations of
"naturally occurring" Helium 3 being vented from the earth
through volcanoes and fissures.

If this Helium 3 were a

sign of fusion, it would explain why the interior of the
earth is hot, and could also explain why other planetary
bodies, such as Jupiter, radiate more heat than they
absorb.
What has all this to do with Jones's fusion
experiment?

In the next section, he explains that he has

attempted to duplicate what may well take place in the
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earth's interior in his electrolytic cells.

The cells

contain a concoction of various "catalytic materials"
including "salts typical of volcanic hot springs."

Into

this soup are inserted electrodes of either palladium or
titanium, both known absorbers of hydrogen.

Through

electrolytic compression, the deuterium molecules absorbed
into the electrodes— in theory— eventually fuse.
Jones is able, then, to use helium as evidence, but
indirectly and in a way that derives rhetorical strength
through the interpretative/conjectural framework, which
asks if a scientific construct exists that may explain
evidence.

The high concentrations of Helium 3 associated

with volcanoes "suggests fusion as a possible source for
the 3H e .11

He further uses the interpretative stance when

he suggests that "it is interesting to consider whether
cold fusion in the core of Jupiter... could account for its
excess heat."

Jones has then in fact used both Helium 3

and heat as evidence, but as indirect, inductive evidence
since Jones has modeled his experiment after those
conditions and reports the observation of fusion.

His

couching such evidence in the interpretative framework
averts any criticism that such fusion evidence has been
ignored, but allows him to use it in a way that avoids
confrontation as direct evidence of his own observations.
The lines of argument of experimental competency and
replication are also addressed through detailed discussion
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of the neutron device— a device developed by Jones and the
only one of its kind— the contents and operation of the
electrolytic cells, and lengthy explanations of how neutron
measurements were made while correcting for the naturally
occurring background count.

Through such a detailed

explanation, Jones sought to diminish the possibility of
criticism from the methodological/definitional issue,
seeking to illustrate the proper use and placement of
measuring instruments and care taken while gathering
measurements.
However, Jones could still not escape criticism on
this issue.

Immediately following Jones's article in

Nature, article referee John M. Carpenter commented on the
problems of measuring neutron production over background
count.

Though Jones and his colleagues had acted correctly

to subtract background readings of naturally occurring
neutron radiation— mostly in the form of cosmic-rays—
Carpenter suggests that the background count can vary
greatly over time.

Further, the energy of such "cosmic-

ray-induced neutrons is at nearly the same energy as that
expected from deuteron-deuteron fusion, 2.45 MeV."
This line of argument is also used by Nature editor
John Maddox in his criticisms of cold fusion in an
editorial that appears in the same issue as Jones's
article.

Maddox laments two facts:

one, that Jones had

not foreseen the "need for contemporaneous controls" to
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limit the effects of changing background counts and, two,
that the Brigham Young neutron detector is one of a kind.
Maddox undermines Jones's cold fusion work by questioning
the collection of neutron data and pointing out that
replication of the Jones experiment is not possible.
Interestingly, Maddox points out that Carpenter
"provided...

[his] comment at our invitation."

No other

article that appeared in that issue of Nature was
accompanied by the referee's comments.

The Maddox

editorial is analyzed in detail below.
Having presented his evidence for cold fusion, Jones
concludes with the claim that "the presence of a fusion
neutron signal was consistently reproduced" through several
runs of the fusion experiment.

He calls for more work to

"disentangle the factors that influence the fusion rate."
He also evokes the fruitfulness line of argument in his
final sentence, emphasizing that even though the observed
effect was small, it "opens the possibility, at least, of a
new path to fusion energy."
The analysis of this article shows Jones's awareness
of the need to structure his discourse to help render his
claims reasonable and identify and disarm possible
criticisms.

Jones skillfully used the interpretative

framework to include indirect evidence for his cold fusion
claims, included detailed description of his apparatus in
the attempt to diminish criticism, evokes a spirit of
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cooperation to sort out factors in this new phenomenon, and
points out, though cautiously, implications for future
applications.

In this circumstance, Jones seems the best

rhetor compared to Fleischmann and Pons, and indeed his
article and claims drew less criticism.

The Issue of Evidence
One other issue implicit in both the Fleischmann and
Pons and the Jones paper that informs the cold fusion
controversy involves concerns about which evidence more
reliably grounds the claims to cold nuclear fusion.

While

Fleischmann and Pons based their conclusions almost
entirely upon excess heat, Steven Jones grounded his fusion
claims on neutron detection.

Fleischmann and Pons drew

much criticism about this emphasis on excess heat,
especially from physicists.

It is not surprising, though,

that Fleischmann and Pons, being chemists, would be more
concerned with the heat results than with either neutron
flux or gas spectrum analysis.

Heat production falls more

in the realm of chemistry; physics deals more with particle
detection and spectrum analysis. Recall from the timeline
that Clayton Callis, ACS president, remarked that, "it
appears chemists have come to the rescue" of the physicists
who had so far failed in attempts at cold fusion
("Scientific" 605).

At a seminar in Geneva, Carlo Rubbia,

a Nobel Prize winner for work in elementary particles,
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remarked that "this was the first time that a chemist had
discovered a neutron"

(Peat 91).

This major feature of the controversy involves
arguments along the evidential/translative stasis and pits
chemists against physicists:

one group looked for evidence

in a typically chemical product, heat, while another looked
at physics products, particle production and gas spectrum
analysis. During the rapid exchange of confirmations and
refutations that soon followed the reports of cold fusion,
"it sometimes seemed the physicists were accusing the
chemists of not knowing how to detect a neutron or properly
measure a gamma ray, to which the chemists would respond
that the physicists did not understand how to run an
electrochemical cell"

(Peat 77).

Some confusion and miscommunication across disciplines
should be expected, as suggested in chapter two in the
discussion of Kuhn's disciplinary matrix, in which each
discipline holds its own models and values for establishing
knowledge, and also by Lyne and Howe, who predict
miscommunication when scientists communicate with others
outside their field.

While no evidence of miscommunication

was found, the analysis suggests that scientists may fail
to identify properly the issues of concern from disciplines
outside their own and thus fail to address these issues
satisfactorily.
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Scientific Correspondence
Cold Fusion Support
Several letters appeared in the same issue of Nature
in which Jones's article appeared, two of which address the
problem of low neutron flux in Fleischmann and Pons's
evidence.

Both, interestingly, address the interpretative

stasis.
One, by Peroni Paolo, begins,

"From the newspaper

accounts, the very small flux of neutrons generated during
the experiment of Fleischmann and Pons is being taken as
proof that their conclusion is not valid"

(Paolo 711).

He addresses the interpretative/conjectural issue by
offering a process "first recognized by Oppenheimer and
Phillips in 1935" that could explain the low neutron flux;
that is, Paolo suggests a scientifically meaningful
construct for interpreting the low neutron flux measured by
Fleischmann and Pons: "when the kinetic energy is as small
as in their [Fleischmann and Pons's] experiment...the
nucleus of the target atom repels the proton but not the
neutron.

Thus, the neutron can be captured by the nucleus

while the proton... will fly off....It follows that if the
experiments described really brought the deuterium nuclei
close enough together to interact, one should expect no
neutron emission and a reaction rate much higher...."
The other letter, by Franceso Premuda, also addresses
the interpretative/conjectural stasis.

His letter begins,
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"Reports of the experiments by Fleischmann and Pons contain
a paradox— that, if fusion reactions do occur in them,
either too much energy is liberated or too few neutrons are
detected.

I wish to supply a possible explanation."

Premuda goes on to offer his "hypothesis" that some regions
within the palladium latticework are more dense than
others, inhibiting particle movement; the product particles
of fusion will then "remain trapped inside....[and] the
reactive particles such as neutrons and 3H will only
infrequently be released to the environment."

In terms of

the interpretative/conjectural issue, Premuda also offers a
scientific construct by which the Fleischmann and Pons
interpretation of the low neutron flux may be considered
scientifically reasonable.

Cold Fusion Criticism
Fleischmann and Pons, of course, were not without
their critics.

Petrasso et a l . submitted a letter that

appeared in the May 18, 1989, issue of Nature (Petrasso,
"Problems").

In the June 29, 1989, issue of Nature,

Fleischmann and Pons reply to these criticisms, and this
letter is followed immediately by a reply by Petrasso et
al.

This exchange of correspondence offers an excellent

opportunity to analyze the type of discourse involved as
scientists argue.

In this particular series of exchanges,

the discussion never moves beyond the evidential/
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conjectural issue, arguing about whether evidence for
fusion exists, and never into the definitional

(what does

the evidence mean) or thecrualitative (which judgments are
warranted by the evidence) or the translative

(which type

of evidence reliably grounds the claims).
The first letter by Petrasso et a l . (Petrasso,
"Problems") addresses the evidential/conjectural, primarily
through the line of argument of experimental competency:
As compelling evidence that fusion had occurred,
they [Fleischmann and Pons] reported the
observation of the 2.22 MeV y—ray line that
originates from neutron capture by hydrogen
nuclei....We argue that the claim of Fleischmann
et a l . to have observed the 2.22 MeV line
characteristic of [fusion] reaction... is
unfounded.
Petrasso et a l . criticize the Fleischmann and Pons
interpretation "on the basis of three quantitative
considerations."

First, the peak in the gamma—ray signal

line at 2.22 MeV is far too narrow, for two reasons.

One,

based on gamma—ray spectra equations, the width of the
reported peak "is a factor of two below the predicted
value."

This criticism raises the line of argument of

external consistency, which demands that observations
correspond with accepted knowledge.

Two, the signal line

is too narrow when one considers the resolution that
Fleischmann and Pons's detector would allow.

Given their

instrumentation, Fleischmann and Pons could not have
observed a peak of such a width at the 2.22 MeV wavelength.
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Second, Petrasso et al. assert that the peak trace had the
wrong profile for a fusion gamma-ray.

Missing from the

published signal line is "clearly defined Compton edge, " a
characteristic smaller peak produced when gamma-rays
undergo a characteristic wavelength shift due to the
Compton Effect.

Again, the Fleischmann and Pons signal

line interpretation fails to meet external consistency, for
any such signal line with a gamma-ray peak at 2.22 MeV
should show the characteristic smaller leading peak at 1.99
MeV.
Third, Petrasso et al. argue that, even though
Fleischmann and Pons reported a low neutron flux, the
neutron rate that they do report is "too large by a factor
of 50" over what one should expect over background rate.
This line of argument relies on the topos of accuracy.
Thus Petrasso et a l . criticize the Fleischmann and Pons
evidence through the arguments of misreading
instrumentation,

lacking expected consistency with

accepted knowledge (the Compton Edge issue), and measuring
inaccurately.
Fleischmann and Pons reply to Petrasso et a l . in a
letter ("Measurement") that appeared in Nature some five
weeks later

and defend themselves and their data by

quickly asserting that "the basis of the [Petrasso et a l .]
critique was the nature of a y-ray spectrum displayed
during a television broadcast."

Also in the opening
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paragraph, the scientists remark on Petrasso et al .' s
"somewhat strange approach to the collection of scientific
data, "

and contend that, in fact, the gamma-ray spectrum

taken from the television and used in the Petrasso et a l .
letter "most certainly was not made in these laboratories."
They go on to conclude that a "curious structure" in the
spectrum criticized in the Petrasso et a l . letter "is
simply the trace of a screen cursor on the multi-channel
analyzer visual display unit!"

Rhetorically, Fleischmann

and Pons defend themselves by attacking Petrasso et al .'s
ethos, suggesting that they acted in an unscientific manner
by obtaining data from an unscientific source and then
using that questionable data as the basis for the critique,
and by attacking Petrasso et al.'s competence by the
embarrassing error of mistaking a cursor trace as a feature
of the spectrum.

They then produce a complete set of

spectra obtained from their experiments; however, in this
set of spectra, the gamma-ray peak appears not at 2.22 MeV
as in their original publication, but at 2.496 MeV.
Fleischmann and Pons go on to acknowledge some problems
"underlying the interpretation of these spectra," but
contend that "removal of the [fusion] cells leads to the
removal of the signal peak" and that this evidence, in and
of itself, is strong evidence of fusion.
As for the lack of the Compton edge, Fleischmann and
Pons conclude that "the size and energy of the signal peak
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imply that any associated Compton edge...will be lost
beneath the rest of the spectrum."
In the reply, Petrasso et a l . ("Reply”) focus on two
aspects of the Fleischmann and Pons letter.

First,

Petrasso et a l . defend against the attack on ethos raised
by Fleischmann and Pons, maintaining that "they... claim,
erroneously, that their televised y—ray spectrum was the
basis of our analysis."

Petrasso et a l . point out that

their critique was actually based on quantitative analysis
of the signal lines first published by Fleischmann and
Pons, controlled neutron—emission experiments that yielded
gamma—ray spectra that were used as a basis of comparison
for the Fleischmann and Pons spectra, and the known
properties, specifically the resolution, of neutron
detection instruments.

Petrasso et a l . successfully defend

themselves against the questions of ethos by giving
detailed accounts of the reasoning behind their critiques
based on evidence unrelated to the televised spectra.
Petrasso et a l . charge further that Fleischmann and
Pons "fail to address our key criticisms"

and then point

to the unexplained change in signal line from the original
claim of 2.22 MeV to 2.496 MeV, contending that
"unfortunately, they [Fleischmann and Pons] are unable to
identify the nuclear process that generates this 2.4 6—MeV
y—ray,"

or to account for its unusual profile.

Petrasso
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et a l . conclude that the "signal line is an instrumental
artefact unrelated to

y-ray

interaction."

Petrasso et a l . place their criticism squarely in the
issue of evidential/conjectural, attacking the foundation
of the Fleischmann and Pons claim.

Because Fleischmann and

Pons chose to argue their claim along evidential/
conjectural lines, the merit of any claim they make is
seriously undermined by questioning their evidence,
evidence that at first was inconclusive and then, as seen
above, seems to inexplicably shift.

The Nature Editorial
As suggested earlier, one of the interesting aspects
of Nature as a forum for scientific discourse is its
diversity.

One can find therein original research

articles, scientific correspondence, such as the
Fleischmann and Pons/Petrasso exchange above, scientific
news, and also scientific views.

An example of the latter

appeared in the April 27, 1989, issue as a full page
editorial by editor John Maddox, entitled "What to Say
about Cold Fusion."

The Maddox editorial is an important

piece of discourse to the cold fusion controversy because
it evokes many of the lines of argument against cold fusion
claims which are inappropriate in research articles of such
hard sciences as electrochemistry and physics. Nonetheless,
the Maddox editorial injects these arguments into hard
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sciences discourse because its editorial opinion is
published alongside original, refereed research.
Therefore, one must conclude that such editorials influence
the scientific community's thinking and attitudes towards
the research being published there as well.
For example, a tag line beneath the heading of the
Maddox editorial reads "Public interest in recent
excitements is to be welcomed, especially if it does not
turn to anger when attempts to replicate the observation of
cold fusion fail— the most probable outcome."

It is

obvious that the Nature editorial, just from this one tag
line, casts serious doubt concerning claims of cold fusion.
The implications on the community's discourse becomes even
more apparent considering the possible influence on
subsequent letter-writers such as Petrasso, above (whose
initial critique of the Fleischmann and Pons gamma-ray data
would not appear for another month; the Fleischmann and
Pons reply/Petrasso reply would not appear for another two
months), and even more so when one considers the impact of
this editorial on the possible reaction to Steven Jones'
article:

the Maddox editorial appears on page 701; Jones'

article appears on page 737— of that same issue.
In "What to say about cold fusion, 11 Maddox's
discussion invokes several lines of argument.

He praises

institutions and practices that have upheld the standards
and values shared by the scientific community, and he takes
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to task Fleischmann and Pons, and to a lesser degree Steven
Jones.

While re-affirming specifically scientific values

and practices, he demonstrates how cold fusion's primary
researchers have violated scientific conventions and
behavior.
Maddox begins by complimenting Fleischmann and Pons on
having "done at least one great service for the common
cause," tongue-in-cheek praise for their having raised
public interest and curiosity in the sciences and notes the
"remarkably good-humoured" questions raised by the lay
public about the truth of the cold fusion claims.

Maddox

finds it "remarkable that so many people are willing to
accept that experimental observations, and the inferences
drawn from them, acquire validity only by replication," and
here raising the first topos and making his first
affirmation about the process of science.
He credits in particular the "daily press, which has
risen superbly to the challenge of cold fusion," that
challenge being discussing cold fusion "in cautious
language, making it plain that cold fusion was not then a
proven reality."

This line of argument, of course, appeals

to the value of experimental replication.

Some newspapers

are praised for having demonstrated both "zeal and
sobriety," characteristics that would also reflect well on
a scientist's ethos.
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One explanation for the widespread interest, Maddox
observes,

"seems to be the general delight that a couple of

people in widely separated universities have used their own
money to pull off a trick on which governments have
lavished huge sums of money in the past 30 years, so far
without result."

In this paragraph, the tone and attitude

of Maddox are evident that he uses throughout the article.
Maddox seems to be appealing to some sense of rooting for
the underdog, a victory for the little man over big
government, resulting in "a general delight."

Note also

that in keeping with this facetious tone and general
pessimism about the cold fusion claims, he terms those
claims "pull off a trick."

Governments "have lavished,"

with all the connotations of excess, luxury, extravagance,
and squander, not invested "huge sums of money" into fusion
research, which suggests that perhaps the huge sums of
money have been somehow wasted.

Fleischmann and Pons are

referred to as "a couple of people," stripping them of
their scientific status.
More explicit criticism of both Fleischmann and Pons
and Jones is made through the topos of experimental
competence, a recurring line of argument in the cold fusion
controversy.

Because of the cold fusion controversy in

general, Maddox argues,

"the scientific community's

reputation is vulnerable in several respects...not the
least of which is that neither...group... carried out the
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rudimentary control experiment of running their
electrolytic cells with ordinary rather than heavy water."
Maddox wonders how one would ever explain this oversight to
the students who have been trained "thatr control
experiments should be as conspicuous in the design of an
investigation as those believed to display the phenomenon
under study," and how to "explain the neglect...to the
world at large."
Maddox next attacks the ethos of Fleischmann and Pons
through the topos of disinterestedness, which questions the
legitimacy of scientist's motives.

The line of argument

follows that credible scientists set aside their own
interests and are "devoted to pursuit of 'science for
science's sake'"

(Prelli 132).

Maddox argues that

Fleischmann and Pons, and Jones, have instead put at risk
the reputation of the scientific community in favor of
claiming cold fusion for themselves.

Further, Fleischmann

and Pons's "self-imposed secrecy" has hampered attempts at
replication, and the lack of control experiments is a
"glaring lapse from accepted practice" that is "another
casualty of people's need to be first with reports of
discovery and with the patents that follow."

Maddox here

makes explicit the suspicion abroad in the scientific
community and surmised in numerous science-news journals
that Fleischmann and Pons rushed into publication in order
to secure patent rights.
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In citing "people's need to be first with reports of
discovery," Maddox implicitly reminds the reader of the
Fleischmann and Pons news conference, an action that can be
criticized by the topos of communality, that is, of
involving members outside the scientific community in
scientific matters.

Had Fleischmann and Pons followed

scientific convention, their discovery would have been
announced in a refereed journal.

Prelli suggests that

"scientists denounce with special severity the scientific
reasonableness of research" if the scientists appear to be
in "complicity with the laity"

(Prelli 132).

This "need to be first" also opens another line of
analysis that enriches Maddox's editorial.

Pons and

Fleischmann's initial article in the Journal of
Electroanalytical Chemistry was not published as a typical
research paper;

their eight—page work appeared as a

"Preliminary note," an atypical entry into this journal.
As such, the article failed, as Maddox has pointed out, to
describe the experiment in sufficient detail to allow
replication to confirm its results, and contained no
mention of the control experiments that Maddox has
correctly argued are typical of this type of announcement.
As stated in chapter one's timeline, Pons and
Fleischmann had submitted a similar paper to Nature that
was rejected.

The paper submitted to Nature was an even
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shorter version than that published by the Journal of
Electroanalytical Chemistry
Fusion" 604).

(Dagani 14; Maddox,

"Cold

Pons and Fleischmann declined to expand

their paper, taking, as Maddox put it, "the view that they
could not at the same time satisfy the referees and get on
with other urgent work"

("Cold Fusion" 604).

Maddox

carefully indicated at that time, however, that "the nonappearance of the [Fleischmann and Pons] article must not
be taken to imply that the experiments... are inherently
less believable than those of Jones"

(whose article was, of

course, accepted by Nature) ("Cold Fusion" 604).
In this editorial, however, Maddox makes it clear that
"the Utah phenomenon is literally unsupported by the
evidence, could be an artefact and, given its
improbability,

is most likely to be one."

It is unclear

what has happened in the interim that would explain so
radical a change in position.
However, the theme of "improbability" is evoked twice
by Maddox.

Earlier in this same editorial, he admits that

"the Fleischmann and Pons experiments raise bigger
questions, if only because the scale of the phenomenon they
report is so much greater."

Here, Maddox argues that

"given its improbability," the claim is most likely false
because it claims too much.

If Maddox is reflecting a

theme at large in the general scientific community, one may
term it the topos of plausibility, in which case the lay
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connotations of reasonable— plausible, likely, moderate,
and sensible— would translate into scientific
reasonableness.

If such is the case, it explains one of

the reasons why Jones' claims, in which the fusion rates
are much lower than Fleischmann and Pons, are the more well
accepted and less criticized.

Jones' claims would be

considered the more scientifically reasonable because they
suggest less disruption to accepted knowledge concerning
nuclear fusion than Fleischmann and Pons's claims, which
require proposing a new type of nuclear fusion.

Fleischmann and Pons's Response
One of the final communications of Fleischmann and
Pons detailing their cold fusion experiments was published
in the July 1990 issue of the Journal of Fusion Technology.
Here, they "enumerate...the major criticisms that have been
made and compare them to our actual procedures."

They

enumerate seven major criticisms that have questioned their
competence as experimenters.

Interestingly, Fleischmann

and Pons seem more concerned about the criticisms that have
arisen from press accounts than those raised in scientific
forums (the latter receive only parenthetical comment):
"there have been numerous comments in the press

(and some

in the scientific literature) about the accuracy of our
methods, and, therefore, the validity of our results."
course, Fleischmann and Pons are acutely aware of the

Of
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critiques directed towards them over the
evidential/conjectural issue.

Following is an analysis of

their responses to their critics.
Responses II.A. & B. confront criticisms along the
lines of experimental competence that question the care
with which Fleischmann and Pons handled the gases that
issued from the electrochemical cells and whether purity
was maintained in the deuterium water bath.

Fleischmann

and Pons maintain that great care was taken on both counts
through the design and close monitoring of their apparatus.
Response II.C.,

"Inadequate Mixing of the Electrolyte

Leading to Marked Temperature Differences in the Cell,"
addresses the arguments of experimental competence made by
Cal Tech chemist Nathan Lewis at the May meeting of the
American Physical Society held in Baltimore.

Working with

a physicist and several coworkers, Lewis built a model of
the Fleischmann and Pons apparatus.

Since no details of

the apparatus had been given, Lewis constructed the fusion
device "using press photos and estimating dimensions from
human arms in those photos"

(Dagani 12).

Lewis reported

having performed several cold fusion experiments, finding
no evidence of neutrons, gamma—rays, tritium, helium, or
excess heat.

Lewis did discover, though, the ease of

committing errors in running such experiments, one of which
was unreliable heat readings if the electrolyte in the
cells is not stirred

("Secret Life" 88; Lindley,

"More than
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Skepticism" 4).

Lewis said that the precision of heat

measurements is "highly dependent on exactly where you
place the thermometer and how well stirred the electrolyte
is"

(Dagani 18).

This criticism is especially relevant

because, in this case, it is a chemist telling Fleischmann
and Pons that they have not run their electrolytic cell
properly.
This criticism of experimental competence is situated
in the methodological/definitional framework because the
issue concerns the proper operation of an electrolytic cell
in which heat measurements are made.

Fleischmann and Pons

reply to this criticism by explaining that stirring is
accomplished by the bubbling solution; in effect, the
electrolyte stirs itself through "gas sparging," and a dye
added to the solution demonstrates a quick dispersal
throughout the cell.
Response II.D., "Inadequate Control of Water Bath Can
Produce Errors," is interesting in that "although this
aspect does not appear to have been raised in the
literature, we comment on it here as a possible critique of
our and other work."

This response shows Fleischmann and

Pons as practicing scientific rhetors, here attempting to
reduce the possibility of criticism along the lines of
experimental competence.

They focus on what they consider

the important details of their cell apparatus and describe
briefly the pumps and mechanism used to maintain water
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levels,

and then point out that "the control that we

achieved may be contrasted to that in other published work,
for example, ± 0.08°C."

Fleischmann and Pons list their

temperature fluctuations at "less than ±0.003°C," thereby
demonstrating that they maintained stricter control in
their cells than many of their critics.
Fleischmann and Pons's sections II.E. and II.F. again
address the methodological/definitional issue,

arguing the

proper application of and use of values in chemical
equations used for measuring heat transfer.
Section II.G. reveal Fleischmann and Pons's reaction
to Maddox's editorial,

reviewed above:

"We believe the

allegations in Nature that we had not carried out blank
[control] experiments before the publication of our
preliminary note have been one of the principal factors
preventing a logical development of research in this area
and in polarizing attitudes."

Of rhetorical importance is

Fleischmann and Pons's clear perception that lines of
scientific research have been hampered, not by lack of
merit of either their evidence or their claims, but by
allegations made in an editorial that questions their
failure to maintain experimental competence and uphold the
values of science.

Not only has research been impeded, but

evidence exists that scientists have taken sides on the
issue, based, again, not on the merits of claim making or
evidence but failure to include descriptions of control
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experiments and apparatus that would allow others to
replicate the experiment.
In answer to Maddox's criticism, Fleischmann and Pons
indicate that "these allegations are difficult to
understand since the preliminary publication did in fact
contain one blank experiment.... Our view has always been
that...[a cell that does not show excess heat] is the most
appropriate blank."

Perhaps Fleischmann and Pons's

definition of control experiment differs from Maddox's.
Maddox called for an experiment conducted in light water
instead of heavy, deuterized water.

Fleischmann and Pons

consider the control to be a cell that shows no excess
heat, against which cells that do exhibit heat may be
compared.

This issue, the methodological/translative.

arises over concerns about which experimental methods will
yield the best evidence.

Fleischmann and Pons are

satisfied that blanks are appropriate for controls; Maddox
feels otherwise.

In either case, this dispute has been

responsible for much of the controversy involving cold
fusion research.

Fleischmann and Pons conclude by

generally dismissing "most of the speculations" about their
experiments and conclusions as "exaggerated at least."
A study of the rhetoric involved in this controversy
suggests that Fleischmann and Pons had at their disposal
the rhetorical means to avert the nature of many of those
speculations.

A paper with the content of their last, but
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published earlier— and so without the need for the
defensive posturing— might have averted much damage to the
credibility of both Fleischmann and Pons and cold fusion
research generally.

Fleischmann and Pons also demonstrate

a seeming unawareness of many issues and lines of argument
that they fail to address until much damage has been done
to the line of research, not the least of which are
experimental competence and replication.

The rhetorical

analysis further demonstrates that philosophical and
sociological aspects enter into the scientific discourse.
I examine the implications of these observations in the
next chapter.

Chapter Five:

Conclusions and Implications

On March 18, 1989, Martin Fleischmann and Stanley Pons
touched off a scientific controversy by announcing at a
University of Utah press conference the discovery of room
temperature nuclear fusion, which promised an abundant
source of clean, cheap energy.

This dissertation attempts

to discover in what ways this cold fusion controversy may
be considered rhetorical in nature and in what ways
understanding the rhetoric involved can increase our
understanding of the controversy in particular, as well as
the way science operates in general.

To accomplish this

task, I have summarized the circumstances surrounding the
controversy, reviewed relevant literature to establish
lines of thought that suggest a rhetorical element in the
practice of science, synthesized a working theory of
rhetorical analysis, and applied that theory to discursive
artifacts arising from the controversy.
Evident in this discourse is the rhetorical element in
the practice of science; considering this element,

I

venture here a definition of scientific rhetoric:

the

activity of science whereby knowledge claims and ideas are
disseminated and mediated among scientists in an attempt to
establish the soundness of those claims and ideas.

In the

occurrence of conflicting evidence for cold fusion, the
scientists,

through their discourse, exchanged the
145
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findings they deemed relevant, addressed the issues they
determined that needed attention, and raised lines of
argument they found central to the investigation, all in
the attempt to determine the soundness of Fleischmann and
Pons's claims.
The exchange of letters in Nature concerning cold
fusion indicate that science involves more than gathering
empirical evidence and interpreting findings.

Scientists

frequently exchange information and debate about which
scientific constructs are more fruitful for application, if
existing constructs can explain unusual or unexpected data,
the competence of experimentation, and so on.

Fueling the

cold fusion controversy was the fact that although
experiments are typically replicable, cold fusion cells
sometimes seemed to work and sometimes did not;
reported some evidence

somelabs

in some cells; some labs would see

evidence sometimes; and others reported nothing.

However,

failure to detect fusion did not disprove the Fleischmann
and Pons claim, for as

one journalist observed, "the

absence of evidence is

not evidence of absence, and

negative results are as open to doubt as any others"
Secret Life" 90).

{"The

Thus, the mediating role of rhetoric is

made evident as scientists attempt to agree, in this
instance, at what point falsification is reached.

Further,

such exchanges provide evidence of the critical discourse
that Popper suggested was so central in arriving at
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"truth," demonstrating rhetoric's central role in
disseminating and mediating knowledge claims among
scientists.
This definition also accommodates the concept that
while a rhetoric of science is not a philosophy,
or history of science, it agrees with such.

sociology,

This rhetoric

is an overarching element that draws upon and is
inextricably bound to the philosophy and sociology of
science, as well as procedures for inquiry and knowledge
production, the concerns of the rhetoric of inquiry.

Two

elements that appeared in the cold fusion discourse
demonstrate this overarching nature of scientific rhetoric.

First, a line of argument that I identified and termed
"plausibility" appears in the cold fusion discourse and may
reflect a value held at large by the scientific community.
In this line of argument, the lay connotations of
reasonable—

plausible, likely, moderate,

translate into scientific reasonableness.

sensible— would
For instance,

Maddox argues that "given the improbability" of Fleischmann
and Pons's claims, they are likely false (604).

Such a

line of thought offers one explanation of why Jones was
received more positively than Fleischmann and Pons, for his
claims of fusion were more modest by a factor of ten and
suggested less disruption to accepted knowledge.
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Second, related to but not identical to this argument
of plausibility is what I term "scientific inertia," the
seeming reluctance of scientists to accept new claims that
may seem far afield of claims allowed by current lines of
thinking and investigation.

Kuhn has pointed out, for

instance, that when current theory fails to explain new
evidence, the individual scientist's own ingenuity and
apparatus are questioned, not the shared values and
assumptions of the specific scientific community;

Lakatos

posited the existence of the "hard core" of scientific
knowledge that is not subject to modification, even though
research programs may shift lines of investigation.
Further evidence of what I termed scientific inertia is
found in the concluding item of a 198 9 Department of Energy
Energy Research Advisory Board (ERAB) report on funding for
cold nuclear fusion.

Though the ERAB reported that "it is

not possible at this time to state categorically that all
the claims for cold fusion have been convincingly either
proved or disproved," the ERAB concluded that
Nuclear fusion at room temperature, of the type
discussed in this report, would be contrary to
all understanding gained of nuclear reactions in
the last half century;
it would require the
invention of an entirely new nuclear process.
(Goodwin 45).
It is clear that "the invention of an entirely new nuclear
process" is not at all considered a positive circumstance.
This scientific inertia is a worrisome philosophical and
sociological phenomenon that is evidenced through
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scientific discourse, worrisome because it apparently
places barriers in the way of scientific progress and could
conceivably stifle scientific and technological
achievement.
The appearances of the "plausibility" line of argument
and of scientific inertia demonstrate the inter
relationships of rhetoric with the philosophy and sociology
of science.

Scientific rhetors must look to the way

science works and scientists work together in order to
discover the available means of presenting their claims and
ideas as scientifically reasonable.

Kuhn's and Lakatos's

philosophies predicted the plausibility argument and
scientific inertia;

the wise rhetor, then, should include

in his or her discourse elements to overcome the reluctance
to accept radical claims or to demonstrate the benefits of
redirecting current research programs and lines of
thinking.

The close study of cold fusion discourse reveals

elements of scientific philosophy and sociology.
Therefore, the discourse may serve as well to illuminate
the actual practices and behaviors of scientists.

All the

above conclusions have implications in the rhetoric of
inquiry, whose concern is structuring human inquiry and
building knowledge.
Though I maintain that science necessarily contains a
rhetorical element, neither my definition nor my rhetorical
analysis go so far as to suggest that science or the body
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of scientific knowledge is wholly rhetorical, or, on the
other hand, suggest the least that science merely includes
some amount of rhetorical activity.

As cited in chapter

three, McMullin maintains that science has two faces,
rhetoric being o ne .

The other involves the logic of

experimentation and data collection.

In the case of cold

fusion, had corroborating evidence never surfaced, no
amount of rhetoric could have convinced the body of
scientists that the process of cold fusion actually worked.
The empirical aspects of experimentation and observation
serve as a check and guardian against such a circumstance.
Yet, asked the question,

"Do scientific writers structure

their discourse to accommodate relevant issues and lines of
argument in order to convince their audience as to the
scientific reasonableness of their claims?" one may quickly
and decisively answer "Yes."
This line of argument raises definite epistemological
questions.

However, answering these questions is beyond

the scope of a rhetorical analysis.

For just as the

rhetoric of science is not a philosophy or sociology, but
agrees with the tenets of such, the rhetoric of science is
not itself an epistemology of science, a point proven by
its ability to agree with many epistemological stances.
Hikins and Zagacki have shown that rhetoric is
commensurable with realist positions through the theory of
rhetorical perspective.

Neither verificationists nor
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subjectivists would argue with a rhetorical element in
science.

The proponents of what Berlin termed the New

Rhetoric or Epistemic Rhetoric believe language is an
integral part of shaping and producing knowledge.

Even the

rationalist Popper admits the importance of critical
discourse in the search for truth:
It is only the idea of truth which allows us to
speak sensibly o f ... rational criticism, and which
makes rational discussion possible— that is to
say, critical discussion in search of mistakes
with the serious purpose of eliminating as many
of these mistakes as we can, in order to get
nearer to the truth. (Popper, "Conjectures" 229)
Popper's role for critical discussion agrees with the
definition of scientific rhetoric that I offered in the
beginning of this chapter: exchanging evidence, raising
issues, and identifying relevant lines of argument to
establish the soundness of knowledge claims.

Obvious from

both the rhetorical analysis of cold fusion discourse and
in Popper's discussion is that scientists do engage in
rhetoric while "doing" science.

For scientists, however,

that rhetoric is combined with the empirical logic of
experimentation and observation.

The question, then, of

whether scientists produce "scientific truth" or "probable
knowledge" is a red herring for the rhetorical critic.

As

suggested in chapter two, the question "Is cold fusion a
reality?" differs from "Do scientists engage in rhetoric?"
Further, depending on one's epistemological bent, truth and
probable knowledge are not mutually exclusive concepts, so
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in some contexts, such a question is not only unanswerable,
but may be even, if you will, unaskable.

The

epistemological question that may interest rhetorical
critics, however, is "How might one's epistemological
stance influence one's rhetorical choice?"

For instance,

if rhetors see the scientist's role as producer of truth
rather than interpreter of evidence, they may choose to
address issues from the evidential framework more so than
those from the interpretative.

I suggest later that this

notion may explain Fleischmann and Pons's rhetorical
choices.
This line of thinking also suggests a caveat for the
rhetorical critic against applying his or her own
epistemological position to the text under analysis.

For

instance, while the Epistemic Rhetoric that Berlin
describes embodies a popular position among humanities
scholars, who frequently conduct rhetorical analyses, such
a position may not be popular among chemists and
physicists.

Perhaps humanities scholars are more amenable

to the notion of the pervasive nature of language because
language is their tool.

Chemists and physicists, however,

have, as McMullin has suggested, another tool: the logic of
experimentation and observation.

The rhetorical critic

must strive to learn how that methodology may influence
rhetorical choice.

To understand deeply the full range of

rhetorical choices open to a scientific rhetor

(or any
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other rhetor, for that matter), one should be aware of that
rhetor's own epistemological assumptions.

Further, another

task for the rhetorical critic becomes clear:

just as

familiarity with the philosophy and sociology of science
enriches a rhetorical analysis, so too may a knowledge of
various epistemological positions.

Considering the above, the goal of the rhetorical
critic, then, is to examine this dissemination and
mediation of knowledge claims and determine to what degree
the scientific rhetor has established the reasonableness of
his or her claims.

Following are some specific conclusions

I have reached considering the results of the rhetorical
analysis of the cold fusion discourse.
For the most part, cold fusion discourse addressed the
evidential issues, focusing on whether the cold fusion
phenomenon did or did not exist.

The scientists involved

disseminated what they considered relevant evidence in
order to address this issue of existence.

Several lines of

argument were invoked within this framework, not
surprisingly those involved with the task of problem—
solution and also those which address ethos, for revealing
improprieties on the part of the experimenters is to raise
questions concerning the scientific reliability of their
evidence.

Fleischmann and Pons chose to address their

discourse to the evidential framework.

This framework's
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foremost concern is considering whether evidence exists
that supports claims; Fleischmann and Pons's evidence was
insufficient to persuade as to the scientific
reasonableness of the claim of cold fusion.

As one

reporter observed, "it is more sensible to reject sporadic
and dubious readings than to reject well-established
theories"

("The Secret Life" 90).

In several instances, the evidential issues raised by
Fleischmann and Pons's critics were translated into
methodological issues, the quest for accurate and reliable
data becoming the task of proper application of
experimental apparatus.

For instance, Cal Lewis's

criticisms concerning stirring of the waterbath in fusion
cells to obtain accurate temperature measurements addressed
the methodological/ definitional issue through the line of
argument of expe rintenta1 compet en ce .

Jones attempted to

reduce the possibility of criticism on this point through
his lengthy description and graphic depiction of the design
and implementation of his neutron detector.
Fleischmann and Pons had at their disposal other
rhetorical options that might have made their claims more
convincing to their audience.

Had Fleischmann and Pons

addressed the interpretative issue, instead of the
evidential, they could have conjectured "that cold nuclear
fusion may be an explanation of the excess heat
phenomenon."

Such a posturing would have allowed
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Fleischmann and Pons to present the same evidence while
maintaining their claim to the cold fusion discovery.
Given the tentative nature of the evidence, this stance
also might have seemed more scientifically reasonable by
conjecturing that a particular scientific construct may
explain the data and therefore evoked a less
confrontational response from their audience.

Having been

presented with the evidence and asked a question such as,
"Could cold nuclear fusion be an explanation?" the
scientific audience could have joined with Fleischmann and
Pons in determining an explanation.

Fleischmann and Pons

may also have been able to invoke the spirit of puzzlesolving that Kuhn suggests fills much of the scientist's
experimental time.
Why Fleischmann and Pons chose to present their work
in the evidential framework as opposed to the more
promising interpretative is a question that cannot be
answered certainly.

However, I suggest here two possible

explanations with some interesting implications for
rhetorical choice.

First,

Fleischmann and Pons may have

been influenced, as discussed above, by their perceptions
of the scientist's role, scientist as producer of truth or
scientist as arguer for interpretations of evidence.

Their

evidential stance is the more decisive and emphatic stance,
implying the notion of scientist as producer of truth; the
interpretative is the more tentative, offering possible
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explanations for the evidence and depicting the scientist
as interpreter of evidence.

An interesting question to

investigate is how epistemological stance may have
influenced Fleischmann and Pons's choice.
Secondly, Fleischmann and Pons may not have addressed
the interpretative issue simply because that is not how
electrochemists typically communicate with other
electrochemists. Electrochemistry is a more applied, less
theoretical field than, for instance, nuclear physics.
Perhaps Fleischmann and Pons never considered the
possibility of situating their discourse in the
interpretative issue because electrochemists are
unaccustomed to theoretical interpretations of their
evidence.

Nuclear physics, on the other hand, is a more

theoretical, less applied field, and physicists might be
more accustomed to writing theoretical, interpretative
papers.

Indeed, as shown in the rhetorical analysis, Jones

does address the interpretative issue when introducing
evidence for his cold fusion claim.

Interestingly enough,

Fleischmann and Pons might have made an appropriate
rhetorical choice considering both their field of specialty
and that field's audience.

This thought suggests that

while Fleischmann and Pons may have used a stance suitable
for the audience of electrochemists, they experienced some
difficulty in identifying and addressing relevant issues
for nuclear physicists.
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The rhetorical analysis suggests also that scientists
communicating beyond their specialty may fail to identify
and therefore address differing concepts of what
constitutes valid evidence.

This finding validates Kuhn's

concept of the disciplinary matrix.
as electrochemists,

Fleischmann and Pons,

fashioned an experiment and employed

apparatus intended to detect heat.

Two of their four

experiments were set up for calorimetric measurements, the
evidence upon which they based their cold fusion claims.
Jones, a physicist, constructed his own sensitive neutron
detector

(the only one of its kind) and proceeded to look

for neutron production as fusion evidence.

Because

physicists considered neutron production as reliable
evidence of cold fusion, Fleischmann and Pons's claims were
less convincing to that audience, especially considering
that the neutron rate they detected was less than normally
expected for such a phenomenon.

And although the

physicists insisted that the low neutron rates disproved
cold fusion, the chemists insisted that the excess heat
production could be due only to a nuclear— not chemical—
reaction.
Fortunately, no permanent rift between chemists and
physicists appeared.

In a July 1989 editorial entitled,

"End of cold fusion in sight," Maddox happily reported that
"the brief spell in April when it seemed as if cold fusion
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would permanently divide chemists and physicists has left
no trace" ("End" 15).
Additionally apparent is that the scientists' basic
assumptions, inherent before the experiments were
conducted, determined the configurations of the experiments
and what evidence the scientists would look for.
Considering such, one may imagine the possibility that
researchers exhibiting such behavior could altogether
overlook other significant phenomenon.
Further hampering Fleischmann and Pons's rhetorical
success was their violation of several scientific values
and standards, damaging their ethos.

Not the least of

these ethical lapses were bypassing the peer-review process
in favor of the infamous press conference and their secrecy
concerning their process and apparatus.

This concern with

ethos was not evident in the research articles themselves,
such lines of argument seeming inappropriate for such a
forum.

However, these concerns are apparent in the Maddox

editorial, indicating that the scientific community was
aware of these violations and their possible effect on the
scientific ethos in general.

That the community of

research scientists involved in fusion research was
influenced by such editorials is easily argued, the best
support being the appearance of the Maddox editorial
decrying the claims of cold fusion in the same issue of
Nature in which Jones's initial publication appeared.

Such
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communications played an important role in the discourse of
this "hard science" controversy, perhaps not to the degree
of research articles, but as one avenue whereby such
concerns are voiced and disseminated.
The unusual circumstances involved in the cold fusion
controversy offered a unique opportunity to examine
rhetoric's role in scientific discourse.

Whether cold

fusion exists as a phenomenon is still a mystery.

However,

I maintain that Fleischmann and Pons had at their disposal
alternative rhetorical choices that could have increased
the effectiveness of their discourse.

Had they followed

scientific standards and approached their rhetorical
situation differently, even though the claims of cold
fusion were not confirmed in the laboratory, the line of
research might have seemed more credible and the scientific
community more energized by its possibilities.

In answering Overington's call to students of rhetoric
to turn their skills to the analysis of scientific
discourse, I have attempted to reveal essential aspects of
the cold fusion controversy— and scientific practice—
otherwise hidden to the lay observer and quite possibly to
the involved scientists themselves.

Informed by a

background in the sociology and philosophy of science and a
working theory of rhetorical analysis, I hope to have
demonstrated that even someone situated far outside the
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field of the hard sciences such as electrochemistry and
atomic, nuclear, and particle physics can access highly
specialized scientific discourse and make it intelligible.
Many possibilities and much work remain for rhetorical
critics.

Perhaps the most exciting possibilities lie in

asking the question, "What are the specific issues and
lines of argument specific to various disciplines?"

Once

these are identified, a matrix such as Prelli's could be
constructed and used in rhetorical analysis for each.

For

instance, what are the issues and arguments used by
psychologists?

Would these differ from those used by

composition theorists?

A formalized method for both

invention and analysis would open the possibilities for the
rhetorical study of many fields.
When studying specific fields, many questions remain
to be answered.

For instance, how do constructs such as

disciplinary matrices affect communication within
disciplines?

Across disciplines?

Do the epistemological

assumptions of that disciplined participants influence
rhetorical choice?

Also,

rhetorical critics should begin

to identify what discursive media exist for those
participants other than the written medium.

For instance,

in the cold fusion controversy, meetings and conferences
played an important role in scientists' conclusions about
cold fusion.

To what extent is that role rhetorical?

How
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do the conclusions reached at such meetings influence
written discourse?
Finally, knowledge of the philosophy and sociology of
science greatly enhanced the rhetorical analysis of the
cold fusion controversy.

This circumstance would imply

that the rhetorical critic should bring to bear in an
analysis knowledge beyond that of only rhetoric.

In

studying various disciplines, then, what types and what
scope of additional knowledge must the rhetorical critic
seek out to enrich an analysis?
These questions suggest that the task of rhetorical
analysis is a complicated one.

However, the importance of

making scientific and other specialized discourses
accessible to those outside the specialties is a task of
increasing importance.

As Overington suggests,

"To

understand public discourse in the closing decades of this
century, we must have some understanding of scientific
discourse"

(81).

Scientists everyday make decisions that

impact more and more on public life and policy.

The

rhetorical critic is in a unique position to sort through
the complexities of strategy and choice, identify issues
and arguments, and make the process and products of
scientific discourse more accessible.
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